

APRIL 2012

REPORT



ISPU

ENGAGING AMERICAN MUSLIMS:

Political Trends and Attitudes

by Farid Senzai, ISPU Fellow and Director of Research



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Acknowledgements

This research project has benefited from the time and contributions of many individuals. In particular, I would like to thank James Zogby and his team at Zogby International for their effort in compiling data from previous surveys, Besheer Mohamed for his analysis of the Pew datasets, Seema Ahmed for her research assistance, Daniel Hummel for his effort with the Florida research, and Karam Dana for his contribution to the final report. Their thinking and contributions are infused throughout this report. I would also like to thank my ISPU colleagues Siwar Bizri, Shireen Zaman, and Hena Khan for their support at various stages of this project. In addition, ISPU wishes to thank the Security & Rights Collaborative, a project of the Proteus Fund, for providing a generous grant to make this report possible.

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Executive Summary

As the 2012 presidential election season moves into full swing, the American Muslim minority community has become a more important player on the political landscape, especially in key swing states. However, data on its members' political attitudes and behaviors have been limited and scattered. This report represents the first effort to comprehensively combine and analyze a decade's worth of research on this particular community in order to provide insights for political strategists and community organizers. It includes analyses of the data by racial and ethnic background, state of residence, education level, and other factors.

The report primarily draws upon surveys conducted by the Muslims in the American Public Square (MAPS) project in 2001 and 2004, the Pew Research Center's national surveys on the American Muslim Community in 2007 and 2011, and the Muslim American Public Opinion Survey (MAPOS) conducted between 2006 and 2008. Two case studies examine the community's political activity in two swing states: Florida and Michigan.

Key findings

American Muslims were at a political and social crossroad after September 11, 2001. Soon after 9/11, the majority of Muslims engaged in a massive political shift away from the Republican Party. Arab-American and South Asian-American Muslims who initially supported Governor George W. Bush (R-TX) in the 2000 presidential election gave their support to Senator John Kerry (D-MA) in 2004. This political realignment was a result of several factors, among them the passing of laws such as the PATRIOT Act and the Bush administration's decision to invade Afghanistan and Iraq. Between 2001 and 2004, the percentage of American Muslims who were dissatisfied with the country's direction soared from 38 percent to 63 percent.

The shift toward the Democratic Party was further strengthened when the community voted overwhelmingly for Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) in 2008. Despite some disappointments, the community strongly supported him during his first term in office. In 2011, Obama continued to maintain a higher approval rating among American Muslims than the general public.

Since 9/11, American Muslims have faced increased discrimination, profiling, and hate crimes. The MAPS study suggests that they have experienced a dramatic increase in all types of

As the 2012 presidential election season moves into full swing, the American Muslim minority community has become a more important player on the political landscape, especially in key swing states.

discrimination since that tragic incident. In 2009, 58 percent of Americans expressed the belief that Muslims face “a lot” of discrimination. The increased animosity toward them, coupled with the rise of Islamophobia, has motivated the community to mobilize and become more politically active.

Research has shown that American Muslims are well informed about politics and pay attention to what is happening both at home and abroad. The vast majority of them want to be politically involved, with 95 percent stating that American Muslims should participate in the political process. Voter registration in the community, however, continues to trail that of the general public. The Pew survey suggests that 66 percent of the community’s were registered to vote in 2011. This percentage would likely be much higher if one were to count only those who are citizens and therefore eligible to vote.

Contrary to growing public opinion, most American Muslims do not see a conflict between their faith and being American or living in a modern society. The majority of them feel that American Muslims, a large number of whom are immigrants or children of immigrants, should adopt American culture and become part of the mainstream. Furthermore, studies support the idea that mosques, like churches and synagogues, are associated with a higher level of civic engagement. American Muslims who were engaged in their mosques were found to be 53 percent more involved in civic activities (e.g., charity organizations, school and/or youth programs) than those who were not connected or involved with a mosque.

Surveys have also examined the community’s opinions on a number of policy issues. The data suggest that American Muslims, much like the American public in general, are more concerned with domestic than foreign policy and with the economy in particular. They generally demonstrate a high level of support for immigration and support the view that immigrants strengthen, rather than burden, the country. However, there are important racial distinctions on this issue, as African-American Muslims have a much less favorable view of immigrants. During the past decade, American Muslims have also become more accepting of homosexuality.

When it comes to American policy in the Middle East and the “war on terror,” American Muslims have been largely unsupportive of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the lowest amount of support being found among African-American Muslims. There has been, however, a decreasing skepticism about the sincerity of the “war against terror” over the decade. Most community members believe that the best way to combat terror is to change American policy in the Middle East and to address the region’s social, economic, and political issues. The majority of them continue to believe that Israel and Palestine can coexist and that a solution to the conflict is possible.

The Florida case study suggests that the American Muslim voter community is increasingly engaged, in part due to the mobilization efforts of Emerge USA and similar organizations. In a swing state, the community has the potential to impact the election's outcome. Similarly, American Muslims in Michigan were found to be very active and politically engaged.

Recommendations

Provide Resources to Further Mobilize the Community: Empirical evidence suggests that American Muslims are increasingly active and civically engaged citizens. Although their level of political incorporation and mobilization has increased over the past decade, the community as a whole is still not as engaged as it could be. For example, some levels of involvement trail behind those of the general public, including the percentage of those who are active members of a political party or contribute to political campaigns. Community organizers must provide the information and resources needed to help motivate and mobilize the community further.

Tap into the Community's Active Segments: Nationally, African-American Muslims were found to be most active in almost all categories of political participation, compared to immigrant Muslims. In addition, state level data in Michigan showed high political engagement by women and young people. Community organizers and political strategists should tap into these highly active subgroups to lead their communities.

Engage with Mosque Communities: Evidence suggests that higher levels of religiosity and mosque attendance lead to higher levels of political participation. This can be seen in mosque participants' higher voting levels, increased awareness of the issues, writing to their representatives, engaging peacefully in political protest, and other indicators of political activity. Candidates, political leaders, and community organizers trying to reach out to Muslim voters should reach out to the mosque leadership and active members.

Speak to the Issues that Concern American Muslims: The American Muslim community can be cultivated for either a Republican or a Democratic candidate, particularly in such swing states as Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Florida. This report highlights evidence that candidates can build better relations with the community by demonstrating awareness of those issues that are of most concern to community members.



Introduction

In a political environment where every vote counts and political elections are intensely contested around the country, especially in key swing states (e.g., Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Florida), candidates are making every effort to seek out new supporters. As part of this effort, their campaigns are increasingly focusing on minority groups who make up significant and growing constituencies. The historic 2008 presidential election witnessed unprecedented shares of the vote by the nation's three largest minority groups, African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans, who comprised nearly 25 percent of the vote. This diversity was driven by increases both in the number and in the turnout rates of eligible minority voters.¹

Scholars have extensively studied the role and impact of minority groups on elections; however, their focus has primarily been on the three major populations mentioned above. Very few studies have concentrated on American Muslims and their level of political participation. This racially diverse community includes a large number of immigrants who have entered the United States over the past century, with the largest numbers entering during the 1980s. Over the past three decades, and the decade since 9/11 in particular, American Muslims as a community have become increasingly visible on the political stage and more sophisticated in their political engagement. For many American Muslims and immigrant Muslims in particular, 9/11 was a watershed moment in their relationship with the United States and their desire to engage politically.

Although they have been in the headlines and often the topic of controversy in recent years, political analysts and community organizers know relatively little about this minority group. Who are the American Muslims? What are their major political behaviors? For whom do they vote? What issues are important to them? No comprehensive source of information addresses these questions and examines their political participation in detail.

To fill this information gap, this report compiles and analyzes much of the existing survey data on the community's political activity over the past decade. In particular, it concentrates on survey data from Zogby International and the Pew Research Center, MAPOS and Gallup. Two case studies of American Muslim political participation in the swing states of Florida and Michigan are presented. Each offers a unique glimpse into the activities of a community finding its political voice and learning the game of American-style politics.

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This report is designed to help policymakers, journalists, campaigners, and political strategists better understand the community's political behavior. It should also be viewed as an invitation to engage more positively with the community and to cultivate better relations. Key swing-state candidates from both parties, as well as political strategists, will benefit from the presented data. The report also serves as a resource to those community members working to help increase levels of American Muslim engagement and activism.

The report begins by describing the survey data used and providing a broad demographic overview of the community. It then examines specific types of American Muslim political and civic engagement, discusses their opinions on key domestic and foreign policy issues, and highlights the experiences of American Muslims in Florida and Michigan. The final section offers conclusions and recommendations.

Overview of the Surveys on American Muslims

While there have been several localized studies of American Muslims in the past decade, they were either limited in scope or criticized on methodological grounds. More recently, numerous organizations have undertaken a concerted effort to correct such shortcomings by studying various aspects of the community. The most important of several major national studies was conducted by the Pew Research Center and released in May 2007 and updated in 2011. The 2007 study was the first comprehensive survey of American Muslims to describe this specific population's attitudes, experiences, and demographics. Conducted in collaboration with the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), it also compared the views of American Muslims with those of the American general population and juxtaposed their views with the attitudes of Muslims in Western Europe and elsewhere. Finally, the study provided valuable insight into policy issues as well as the ongoing debate over the American Muslim community's actual size.

Titled *Muslim American: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream*, this study was based on a sample size of 1,051 American Muslim adults aged 18 or older.² After taking into account the complex sample design, the average margin of sampling error on the 1,050 completed interviews was determined to be +/-5 percentage points at the 95 percent level of confidence. Pew completed a follow up study in 2011.

In 2001 and 2004, Zogby International conducted in-depth surveys of American Muslims for Muslims in the American Public Square (MAPS). The data for the MAPS study were derived from interviews with Arab-American respondents (n = 501) aged 18 or older.³

For the purposes of this report, ISPU in partnership with Zogby International analyzed survey data that spans the past decade. In addition, ISPU conducted field work in Florida and Michigan to support the case studies.

Research and polling on American Muslim public opinion since 2004 largely shows that most of the political and demographic trends illustrated in the 2001 MAPS survey (see Appendix A) have continued. The major post-2004 contributions to understanding the community's viewpoints have been the 2008 Muslim American Public Opinion Survey (MAPOS) and the most recent Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) studies, both of which further illuminate the effects of religiosity and mosque involvement on this population's political and civic life.

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Such surveys face several limitations. Due to their miniscule percentage within the larger American population, estimated at 0.5-0.7 percent by several national surveys (Pew 2007), American Muslims have never been surveyed via probability methods on the national level. In the absence of nationally representative samples of American Muslims selected by random techniques, many pioneering studies drew on purposive samples based on convenience of access, mosque membership lists, Muslim organizations, or particular local communities—techniques that severely impair the representative quality of samples.

Perhaps the greatest weakness is the limited data on the community's subgroups and the subsequent inability to analyze the differences among them. This report has attempted to provide some breakdown along subgroup lines, but this was only possible on some key issues. Another weakness is that most recent surveys have focused on a specific aspect of American Muslim opinion rather than presenting a comprehensive picture. Finally, the lack of continuity between surveys creates a problem for those attempting to assess how the participants' opinions have changed during the last decade. Even in instances where questions have been asked on similar subject matter as previous surveys, differences in the question's wording or available answers makes such assessments difficult and often impossible.

A Portrait of the American Muslim Community

Estimates of the Population

The community's size, estimated to range from 2 to 10 million,⁴ has been an issue of debate for several years. American Muslim leaders and advocacy groups have generally estimated the population at the higher end of this range, with most insisting that the number is somewhere between 6 to 10 million.⁵ They have cited increased levels of Muslim immigration since the 1960s, as well as higher conversion and birth rates, as contributing factors. For American Muslims, higher numbers suggest more grassroots power, more representation, and a larger community that can plausibly affect political outcomes. Size directly corresponds to resources, increased power, and political influence. A well-publicized 2001 study, sponsored by the American Jewish Committee and conducted by Tom Smith of the University of Chicago's prestigious National Opinion Research Center, estimated that the number was between 1.9 and 2.8 million.⁶ Many community leaders, activists, and scholars criticized this study, expressing concern about both its methodology and the sponsoring organizations' motives.⁷

As American census forms do not ask about religious affiliation, it is difficult to determine the community's exact size. Estimates have been derived by analyzing census data on the basis of immigration patterns from predominantly Muslim countries⁸ and by examining patterns of American Muslim institutionalization (e.g., the number of mosques and congregation size).⁹ Finally, some estimates have been based on major Muslim population centers in the country.¹⁰

The Pew Research Center has the reputation of being an independent and objective data-driven “fact tank” that simply reports on what it finds. Over the years, its reputable surveys conducted among the American population at large have enabled it to compile a statistic known as the “incidence” rate. Based on all of the random phone calls it has made in previous surveys and on this survey, Pew found that 0.06 percent of all Americans were Muslim. According to this estimate, the Pew report put the Muslim population at 1.535 million. By adding this number to the estimated number of Muslim children based on census data (another estimate derived from Pew), Pew arrived at a population of 2.35 million in its 2007 and 2.75 million in the 2011 study. Although cautious to state that this figure was only an “approximation,” it unsurprisingly raised concern among community activists. Project MAPS director Zahid Bukhari of Georgetown University, a leading scholar of American Muslim demographics, also took issue with the Pew estimate and suggested the population was underestimated.¹¹

If one were to take the Pew data as the most authoritative, the community forms only a minuscule percentage of the total population. It should be noted, however, that it continues to grow at a relatively faster pace than other religious communities (primarily due to immigration and conversion). Some scholars go so far as to suggest that Muslims could eventually become the second largest religious community in the United States.¹² As mentioned, Pew estimated the total American Muslim population to be 2.75 million in 2011. This report relies on this Pew data for estimates of the Muslim population.

Racially and Ethnically Diverse


Based on the Muslim world’s diversity, one would expect this country’s immigrant Muslim population to be very diverse as well.¹³ Almost two-thirds of American Muslims are first-generation immigrants, the majority of whom came from the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. About 80 percent of American Muslims are American citizens, including 70 percent of those who immigrated and are now naturalized. Over a third (37 percent) were born in the United States. This racially diverse group identified as white (30 percent), African American (23 percent), Asian (21 percent), Hispanic (6 percent), and other/mixed race (19 percent). One out of five American Muslims is a convert.

The majority of American Muslims today are immigrants, mainly from South Asia and the Middle East, or their second-generation children. The Pew study revealed that they are far more integrated into American society than are their counterparts in Western Europe. The percentage of respondents who have a low income is only 2 percent greater than that of the general population, while in Britain it is 22 percent greater and in France it is 18 percent greater. Among American Muslims, 71 percent believe that those who want to get ahead can do so. Muslim immigrants are entering the United States fairly rapidly and integrating into mainstream society. In sharp contrast, European Muslims tend to be “ghettoized” – separated culturally and economically from the majority populations. This creates gaps in education and income, and can lead to unrest.

The American Muslim population is relatively young (almost 60 percent are aged between 18 and 39), compared to 40 percent of the general public. Not surprisingly, this youthful population includes a high proportion of students: about a quarter are enrolled in college or university classes. A similar percentage of Muslims have a college degree, which is in line with all adults in the United States. Full-time employment rates are also similar among American Muslims and the general public at about 40 percent; however, a higher percentage of young Muslims are underemployed (29 percent compared to 20 percent) (Pew 2011).

While Muslims constitute 0.62 percent of the population nationally, a few major states (e.g., New York and California) and swing states have high concentrations of Muslims (Figure 1).¹⁴ In Maryland, the state with the highest concentration, 2 percent of the adult population is Muslim. Other states where more than 1 percent of the population is Muslim are Virginia (1.5 percent), New York (1.4 percent), Michigan (1.4 percent), New Jersey (1.2 percent), and Pennsylvania (1.1 percent). Swing states (aka battleground states) have slight margins in voting results in regards to Democratic and Republican candidates. Courting minorities in these states could tip the scale in a particular candidate’s favor and thus determine the outcome. In these states, minority communities including Muslims have a greater potential to have their voices heard than in other places because of the electoral dynamics of battleground states within national politics.

Figure 1: Concentration of adult Muslims (aged 18+) in major US states



(Pew Research Center 2011)


Within states, the Muslim population is not evenly distributed: 55 percent live in urban areas, 44 percent live in suburban areas, and only 1 percent live in rural areas. The Pew survey data also suggest that certain metro areas have a high proportion. For example, the Detroit metro area (which includes Dearborn) is 2.6 percent Muslim, the Washington DC metro area is 1.8 percent Muslim, and the Philadelphia metro area is 1.9 percent Muslim.

As ethnographic and historical studies have suggested, the Muslims of the Detroit area are predominantly of Arab descent (72 percent), which is far greater than the national average (23 percent of American Muslims). Other metro areas with distinctive ethnic and racial profiles include Washington DC (where 24 percent of Muslims are of Iranian descent, although they account for only 8 percent of all American Muslims), Los Angeles (38 percent Iranian), and Philadelphia (54 percent African American, although they account for only 19 percent of all American Muslims).

When viewed at the state level, as seen in Figure 2, one notices that Ohio has a disproportionate number of African Americans (46 percent of the state's Muslims are African American). In addition, Texas has a disproportionately high number of South Asian Muslims (43 percent). Finally, Florida has a disproportionate number of Muslims from areas other than Africa, Europe, and South Asia. Presumably most of these respondents came from Latin America.

Given this ethnic and racial breakdown, it should not be surprising that Ohio and the Philadelphia metro area have an especially high number of native-born Muslims (60 percent and 82 percent, respectively, compared with a national average of 35 percent), as does New Jersey (62 percent). In contrast, a lower than average proportion of Los Angeles' Muslims is native-born (16 percent). In addition, Texas' Muslim population boasts a significantly higher than average percentage of naturalized citizens (58 percent compared to a national average of 42 percent). Los Angeles has a large gender disparity (only 22 percent of the Muslim population is male) and a significant age disparity (average age is 45, compared to national average of 39).

Figure 2: Racial diversity of Muslims in America, by state



(Pew Research Center 2007)

Increased Discrimination Since 9/11

American Muslims have mixed views on their community’s relationship with other Americans. Slightly more than a third of them feel that, based on their own experience, Americans have been respectful of Muslims yet still believe that American society as a whole is disrespectful and intolerant of their culture and religion. Another third thought that Americans have been tolerant and respectful of Muslims. A majority of American Muslims said a friend or family member has suffered discrimination since the September 11 attacks.

Nearly a decade after 9/11, Americans believe that Muslims face more discrimination than any other religious group in the country. The MAPS study reveals a rise in cases of discrimination. As Table 1 suggests, American Muslims have experienced a dramatic increase in all types of discrimination since 9/11. Similarly, a 2009 Pew survey of religious attitudes found that 58 percent of Americans believe that Muslims face “a lot” of discrimination. The same survey also showed that 38 percent of Americans believe that Islam encourages violence more than other religions, compared with 45 percent who do not believe this. Although lower than the 2007 numbers, they were still higher than those in 2002, when 25 percent of Americans held this view. These negative perceptions did not form in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, however, for at that time there was an initial outpouring of support for American Muslims. Instead, as Table 1 shows, negative perceptions and various forms of discriminatory behavior became more apparent over time. When asked in 2004, 40 percent of American Muslims reported that they have been profiled since 9/11. While 59 percent had not directly experienced discrimination since 9/11, 57 percent knew someone who had.

Table 1: American Muslims’ experience with discrimination (percent) (MAPS 2001, 2004)

STRONGLY AGREE	All	African American	South Asian	African	Arabs	Other
I or others experienced discrimination since 9/11 (2001 data)	56.0	61.1	50.0	53.0	60.0	57.7
I have experienced discrimination since 9/11 (2004 data)	40.1	46.8	35.6	36.8	39.3	45.0
Others have experienced discrimination since 9/11 (2004 data)	58.5	61.8	56.2	54.1	58.4	61.9
TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION						
Verbal abuse, 2001	25.3	22.0	22.5	23.6	30.9	27.0
Verbal abuse, 2004	43.7	49.3	41.4	33.6	44.4	46.2
Physical abuse, 2001	6.2	5.6	6.3	7.3	5.8	7.1
Physical abuse, 2004	11.9	11.3	10.4	12.7	11.9	16.2
Racial profiling, 2001	8.3	14.2	6.5	4.9	8.0	6.2
Racial profiling, 2004	24.0	22.9	22.7	24.8	25.3	25.7
Denied employment, 2001	2.8	4.5	2.3	2.4	1.6	4.0
Denied employment, 2004	18.0	20.6	17.0	16.4	16.7	20.2

When asked if the American media and Hollywood were fair in their portrayal of Muslims and Islam, American Muslims overwhelmingly felt that both are unfair (Table 2).

Table 2: Percentage of American Muslims who felt the portrayal of Muslims on-screen is fair (MAPS 2001, 2004)


	Yes		No		Not sure	
	2001	2004	2001	2004	2001	2004
The Mainstream American Media	25	17	68	76	7	7
Hollywood	13	10	77	77	10	12

There has been a steady rise of Islamophobia since 9/11. Muslim employees, businesses, charities, and mosques have all become targets. Muslim school children have seen a rise in bullying. After 9/11, the initial reaction of government officials toward Islam was largely positive. But as the “war on terrorism” expanded, “officials in Washington became less inclined to confront anti-Muslim bias, and sometimes viewed Muslims as suspects.”¹⁵ In the 2008 presidential campaign Islamophobia became a campaign tactic designed to attract voters; it is fulfilling the same role in the 2012 presidential campaign. Some argue that this strategy was largely unsuccessful in 2008; however many others warn that this may have gained traction more recently and could be a successful vote-winning strategy. In such a case, American Muslims would become more and more isolated and potentially be racially or religiously profiled more frequently. Islamophobia is currently being used as a means to garner votes in congressional campaigns, as is the case with Allen West (R-FL) in Florida’s 22nd Congressional District and as it was for various prominent Tea Party members in 2010.¹⁶

The growing use of Islam as a scare tactic to get elected has also propelled American Muslims into the public spotlight to explain themselves and become more active in their own community and in local/national politics. Many of them abandoned their prior view that doing so was a matter of choice, for they felt they were being discriminated against on a daily basis.¹⁷ The need to get involved in more grassroots activism, politics, and the press became more important as they began to realize that they both live in the United States and need to invest in the future for themselves and their children.¹⁸

The proposed construction of the New York City Muslim community center in lower Manhattan, also referred to as the “Ground Zero mosque,” is probably the most significant controversy surrounding the question of American Muslim acceptance in the United States. Nearly 50 percent of Americans felt Muslims should not be permitted to build it; 70 percent of American Muslims felt it should be allowed (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Opinions on whether the Ground Zero mosque should be built




(Pew Research Center 2011)

Value of Religion Not at Odds with American Culture

The MAPS 2001 and 2004 surveys addressed the question of spirituality and Islam's role in community members' daily lives. Over 95 percent of the respondents said that both were important in their daily lives. At the same time, survey findings suggest that the majority of Muslims (57 percent) felt mosques should express their views on day-to-day social and political questions, while 37 percent said that mosques should keep out of political matters. About half of American Muslims felt that the *khatib* (the person who delivers the Friday sermon) should not discuss a candidate's political views.

The question of whether Muslims can live and be productive citizens in modern societies has long been debated. American Muslims generally felt that there is no conflict between being Muslim and living in a modern society (Pew 2007). This was found to be true across all ethnic and racial lines (Figure 4).


Figure 4: Is there a conflict between being a Muslim and living in modern society?



(Pew Research Center 2007)

Similarly American Muslims overwhelmingly believed that they should adopt American culture. This raises the question of whether Muslims should be accepted as part of American history and culture. Interestingly, African-American Muslims were the least likely to agree with this proposition, but were the most likely to state that Muslims should neither reject nor adopt it, which suggests an issue with how the question was framed (Figure 5). Muslims are often acculturated, given that they have adapted to American life. But the question of incorporation still remains unanswered, since this requires the community’s acceptance by mainstream society.

Figure 5: Should American Muslims adopt American culture or remain distinct?



(Pew Research Center 2007)



Political Attitudes and Behavior of American Muslims


Studies show that the majority of American Muslims follow what takes place in government and public affairs most of the time. This varies a little along geographic or partisan lines. The 2011 Pew study, for instance, found that nearly 70 percent of them pay attention to politics “most” or “some” of the time. The MAPS survey found that 90 percent of them discuss politics with family and friends “always” or “sometimes” (Table 3). American Muslims pay attention to politics at the same level as the general public, when one combines “most of the time” and “some of the time” (Figure 6).

Mosques, like churches and synagogues, are shown to be associated with a higher level of civic engagement and to contribute greatly to creating a more informed and engaged electorate.

Table 3: How often American Muslims discuss politics with family and friends (MAPS 2001, 2004)

	2001	2004
Always	35	42
Sometimes	50	48
Hardly ever	9	8
Never	6	3
Not sure	1	—

Figure 6: How often do American Muslims pay attention to politics?



(Pew Research Center 2011)

More than half of American Muslims surveyed reported that they follow international affairs and foreign policy news on television, followed by the Internet and newspapers (Table 4).

Table 4: Percentage of American Muslims who use the following sources to get most of their information about international affairs or foreign policy (MAPS 2004)

Television	53%
Online	17%
Newspaper	13%
Radio	5%
Family and Friends	2%
Books	1%
Magazines	1%
School	—
Other	5%
Not sure	2%

Vast Majority of American Muslims Want to be Politically Involved

The American Muslim community is active in the political process and intends to participate over the long-term. According to the 2004 MAPS survey, 86 percent said that it is important for them to participate in politics—seven times as many as who said it is not important (Table 5) and slightly higher than the 82 percent in 2001. This holds across all geographic regions. By similar numbers, Muslims say it is important to them that their children also participate in politics.

Table 5: Percentage of American Muslims who think it is important to participate in politics (MAPS 2001, 2004)

	Very Important		Somewhat Important		Not Important		Not Sure	
	2001	2004	2001	2004	2001	2004	2001	2004
For you	44	53	38	33	17	13	2	1
For your children	46	58	29	24	16	10	9	7

American Muslims are civically engaged in their communities and are politically active. Table 6, which shows various answers to questions that seek to determine the level of political activity, reveals that American Muslims are active on multiple levels. African-American Muslims were found to be most active in all categories of political participation, compared to immigrant Muslims, with the exception of visiting a political website. In particular, they were the most likely to boycott and attend a political rally.

Table 6: American Muslim political participation, by race and ethnicity (MAPS 2001, 2004)

Measure of Participation	Year	All	African American	South Asian	African	Arabs	Other
"Mostly" follows Politics	2001	60.3	72.0	50.4	54.7	64.0	63.3
	2004	64.3	72.1	60.1	44.5	65.2	72.2
Contacted politician/Media	2001	50.0	62.7	42.3	41.9	48.3	57.4
	2004	54.5	73.6	44.1	31.3	54.2	66.1
Attended a rally	2001	40.2	61.0	29.4	32.3	41.3	38.1
	2004	45.9	67.4	33.8	32.8	46.0	51.7
Discuss politics "always"	2001	35.2	42.8	25.9	32.3	42.1	35.3
	2004	41.7	45.5	31.4	39.6	49.8	47.6
Visited political Website	2001	34.1	38.4	30.3	22.5	39.7	32.5
	2004	41.0	32.9	40.4	43.1	42.0	52.4
Boycotted	2001	30.2	51.3	18.5	17.2	31.6	32.3
	2004	36.7	67.5	20.2	10.4	37.6	45.8
Contributed to Candidate	2001	33.7	46.1	27.0	32.6	33.2	33.0
	2004	35.6	40.8	31.8	28.5	35.1	43.2
Active member of Party	2001	25.9	33.8	22.9	26.6	25.7	21.8
	2004	25.1	31.6	18.8	38.2	21.9	30.4

Political participation and civic engagement increased in 2004, compared to the data from 2001. The one exception was whether or not respondents considered themselves active members of their political party, which remained unchanged at 25 percent.

Muslim Identity is Key Factor in Voting Decisions

In the post-9/11 world, American Muslim identity has become key in voting decisions. According to the 2004 MAPS study, nearly 70 percent of American Muslim voters suggested that being Muslim is important in their voting decision (51 percent called it "very important," 18 percent that it was "somewhat important," and 29 percent that it was "not important"). Yet they were not fully engaged politically in 2004. By a 3:1 margin (73 percent versus 24 percent), they did not consider themselves active members of their political party. This was less pronounced among

Democrats, where the margin dropped to 2:1 (65 percent versus 33 percent). Republicans mirrored the overall trend, while among Independents the margin was 80 percent to 17 percent. Furthermore, American Muslims were more likely to have volunteered time for a political candidate than to be active party members.

Community members have a strong desire for political unity within their religion. Around 80 percent of American Muslims agreed with following the agenda of the American Muslim Taskforce on Civil Rights and Elections (AMT), a nationwide coalition of the ten largest Muslim organizations. A majority of American Muslims said that the community should vote as a bloc for president in 2004. Around 70 percent said the endorsement of a presidential candidate by the AMT would be important to them.

Charity and Civic Engagement are Priorities for Most American Muslims

Muslims do not limit their charitable contributions and goodwill to fellow Muslims and Muslim organizations. In fact, 97 percent of American Muslims thought that all Muslims should donate to non-Muslim service programs (e.g., aid for the homeless), 90 percent thought that Muslims should participate in interfaith activities, 87 percent thought that Muslims should support worthy non-Muslim political candidates, and 85 percent thought that the influence of religion and spiritual values in American life should increase.

Various studies show that American Muslims are very active in their communities. In the MAPS surveys of 2001 and 2004, participants were asked various questions related to their level of civic engagement in their own community (Table 7). Three out of four reported donating time or money or serving as an officer of an organization established to help the poor, sick, the elderly or homeless; 71 percent reported donating time or money or serving as an officer of their mosque; and 63 percent were active in school or youth programs. On the other hand, 53 percent said they have not donated money or time or served as an officer of a community or civil group. Almost half (45 percent) said they have contributed to running a professional organization. Muslim Americans were more likely to donate money than time to arts or cultural organizations (17 percent versus 10 percent). Over a third (35 percent) said they have been active in some ethnic organization, 30 percent reported helping to run a Muslim political action committee or public affairs organization, and 25 percent claimed to have been actively involved in a veterans or military service organization. The vast majority (83 percent) have not actively contributed to running a labor union.

Table 7: Percentage of American Muslims involved in community activities (MAPS 2004)

	Donated Time		Donated Money		Served as an Officer		A Combination of These		Total %		None of These	
	2001	2004	2001	2004	2001	2004	2001	2004	2001	2004	2001	2004
Any organization to help the poor, sick, elderly or homeless	18	13	32	30	—	1	27	31	77	75	22	24
Any mosque or other religious organizations	16	11	19	18	—	1	36	41	71	71	29	28
School or youth programs	27	22	12	9	2	1	27	31	69	63	—	35
Any neighborhood, civic or community group	23	22	7	6	1	1	15	18	45	47	54	53
Any professional organization	15	12	13	11	1	2	18	21	46	46	51	53
Any arts or cultural organization	14	10	16	17	1	1	12	14	42	42	56	57
Any ethnic organizations	12	8	9	8	—	—	15	19	36	35	63	64
Any Muslim political action or public affairs organization	12	7	8	8	1	—	13	14	33	29	66	69
Any veteran's or military service organizations	7	4	13	13	1	1	4	7	24	25	75	75
Any trade or labor unions	6	4	5	5	1	—	6	8	17	17	82	83

The MAPS surveys also measured the level of agreement and disagreement with statements designed to examine American Muslim attitudes in relation to various civic issues. The results show that they tend to believe that civic responsibility to their own community and larger society is important (Table 8).

Table 8: American Muslim values and secular society (percentage) (MAPS 2001, 2004)

	Agree		Disagree	
	2001	2004	2001	2004
Muslims should donate to non-Muslim social service programs like aid for the homeless	96	97	3	2
Muslims should be involved in American civic and community development organizations to improve America	96	—	3	—
Muslims should participate in the political process	93	95	4	3
Muslims should be involved with the American media and the educational system to change the image of Islam	91	—	6	—
Muslims should participate in interfaith activities	88	90	6	4
Muslims should financially support worthy non-Muslim political candidates	88	87	8	9
The influence of religion and moral values in American public life should increase	83	85	11	12

Mosques Encourage Moderation and Political Engagement

The 2001 and 2004 MAPS surveys show that American Muslims are highly engaged in their mosques (see Appendix B). In recent years, culminating with Peter King’s (R-NY) congressional hearings, many politicians and pundits have expressed concern that mosques have a radicalizing and alienating effect on American Muslims. The 2007-08 MAPOS study delves deeper into this issue and shows empirically that the opposite is true. MAPOS reveals an association between higher levels of involvement in mosque-related activities and participation in American politics. Thus mosques, like churches and synagogues, are shown to be associated with a higher level of civic engagement and to contribute greatly to creating a more informed and engaged electorate.

MAPOS findings show that those American Muslims who are more actively engaged with their mosques tend to believe that Islam is compatible with the American political system. Those with no such connection or involvement report an average of 1.7 acts of political participation per year (out of a scale of 0-4 acts). In contrast, those who say they are “very involved” report an average of 2.6 political acts (such as writing a letter to a public official, participating in protest or rally, participating in a community meeting, etc.), which amounts to a 53 percent increase in civic engagement. Thus, rather than having a radicalizing or alienating effect, American mosques can be shown empirically to help Muslims integrate into American political life.


Religiosity was also found to have an impact on the Muslim vote.¹⁹ Mosque participation and a higher level of group consciousness were also found to be associated with Arab-American and African-American Muslims. Mosque participation and civic involvement were found to be associated with Americans of Arab and South Asian descent. Arab-Americans, in particular, display a direct relationship between mosque involvement and political involvement.²⁰ This data reveal a relationship between religiosity and political involvement that mirrors other religious groups in the United States.

The community's great diversity could lead many to prefer their group over other Muslim groups. This would continue to stratify the group, thus preventing it from making any tangible efforts at a singular group-based level as Muslims. It would then be more appropriate to be talking about Pakistani-, Syrian-, or African-American voters. The level of religiosity among the different groups might challenge this assumption. One might assume that the more religious a person is, the less one truly considers race to be a defining characteristic. Yet this is a perilous assumption, since religiosity might also follow cultural attachments. However, the MAPOS study shows that mosque attendance increases American Muslims' identification with their religion and decreases that of national origin.²¹

Vast Majority of American Muslims Registered to Vote

If one uses the Pew figures of 2.75 million American Muslims, we can extrapolate that the total number of registered American Muslim voters is approximately 1,188,000 (Figure 7).

Figure 7: What percentage of American Muslims are registered voters?



(Pew Research Center 2011)

As shown in Table 9, slightly more Muslims were registered to vote in 2004 than in 2001. While the two separate polls show a decline in the percentage of American Muslims registered to vote when compared with one another, there is a rise within each poll. The Pew Study, however, lacks the follow-up questions of the 2001 and 2004 Project MAPS that explain why the respondent chose not to register and whether they intend to register before the next election.

Table 9: Percentage of American Muslims registered to vote (MAPS 2001, 2004, Pew 2007, 2011)

	MAPS		Pew	
	2001	2004	2007	2011
Yes	79	82	63	66
No	21	17	30	30


When one compares voter registration among community members with that of the general public, we find that the registration levels for American Muslims are lower. In 2007, 66 percent of them were certain that they were registered to vote, compared to 79 percent of the general public. When asked why they had not registered, more than half explained that they were not citizens (Table 10). Among those that are citizens and therefore eligible to vote, American Muslims have some of the highest rates of registration.

Table 10: Percentage of American Muslims who offered reasons for not registering to vote (MAPS 2001, 2004)

	2001	2004
Not a citizen	53	59
Not interested/never thought about it/never got around to it	17	13
Too difficult to register	4	3
My vote doesn't make a difference	3	1
Considers it un-Islamic	—	2
Other	20	17
Not sure	4	6

In 2007 Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New Jersey had the highest level of native-born Muslims (Figure 8). This reflects in the large number of native-born African-American Muslims residing in these states. The states with the highest immigrant Muslim populations were Texas, Virginia, Michigan, California, and Florida. This was a consequence of the large number of Arab Muslims immigrating to Michigan and similarly large number of South Asian Muslims immigrating to California and Texas.

Figure 8: Citizenship of US based Muslims, by state



(Pew Research Center 2007)


When *non-registered* American Muslims were asked in both 2001 and 2004 if they intended to vote, 72 percent said that they planned to do so. A high proportion of *registered* voters (95 percent) in 2004 planned to vote in national elections, and 88 percent of them reported being “very likely” to vote (Table 11). This is virtually unchanged from 2001.

Table 11: Registered American Muslim’s likelihood of voting in national elections, percentage (MAPS 2001, 2004)

	2001	2004
Very likely	85	88
Somewhat likely	9	7
Not likely	6	4
Not sure	1	1

According to the 2011 Pew study, 55 percent of those aged 18-29 are registered to vote (Figure 9), which is generally in line with the general public. As expected, voter registration among American Muslims increases with age, with registration for those aged 55 and over being the highest (almost 80 percent).

Figure 9: American Muslims registered to vote, by age




(Pew Research Center 2011)

As one might expect, registration levels increase as income levels rise. Close to 80 percent of American Muslims whose annual income is more than \$75,000 are registered, as compared to 50 percent of those who make less than \$30,000.


Although most community members did not vote in the 2004 presidential election, more than half were registered in 2007 (Figure 10). The remainder are divided about evenly between people who were eligible but not registered to vote and respondents who were ineligible to vote (e.g., under 18 or non-citizens). This shifts heavily among African-American and Caucasian Muslims. In both of these groups, about three-fourths of respondents were registered to vote and most of the remainder were eligible but choose not to. In addition, Arab, African, and Iranian immigrant Muslims are less likely to be registered than other groups of American Muslims, while being more likely to be non-citizens. Education is also related to registration, with more educated respondents being more likely to report that they are registered to vote (Figure 11).

Figure 10: American Muslim voter registration, by race



(Pew Research Center 2007)


Figure 11: American Muslim voter registration, by education



(Pew Research Center 2007)

The registration pattern also varies by area, a shift that is probably related to racial patterns. For example, a large proportion of the Philadelphia metro area’s Muslims are registered to vote, and those living in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Texas are by far the most likely to be registered to vote (Figure 12).

Figure 12: American Muslim voter registration, by state



(Pew Research Center 2007)

American Muslims Have Shifted Party Affiliation Over the Last Decade

According to the 2007 Pew study, when asked to identify themselves as “conservative,” “moderate,” or “liberal,” the most common response was “moderate” (46%). Comparable numbers identify as “conservative” (22%) or “liberal” (31%). Respondents who identified themselves as Republican were unlikely to consider themselves moderate, with 49% believing they were “conservative” or very “conservative,” and 44% identifying as “liberal” or “very liberal.” In addition, a somewhat higher than average number of Independent voters consider themselves “moderate,” and liberal voters are more likely to express no political preference. Other than those patterns, there is no relationship between views on the liberal/conservative axis and party preference.

CAIR’s 2008 and 2009 study results support much of the political trends demonstrated in the Project MAPS reports between 2001 and 2004. The CAIR Poll of Muslim Americans shows the community’s ongoing migration away from the Republican Party; only 8 percent of them identified as Republicans in 2008. This migration, however, has been toward increased numbers of Independents instead of affiliation with the Democratic Party. The percentage of American Muslim Independents rose to 36 percent from the 2004 figure of 31 percent.

The 2006–08 MAPOS sheds some light on the growing number of American Muslim Independents. Using data on religiosity and party affiliation, the 2008 MAPOS discovered that American Muslims who showed higher degrees of religiosity are far less likely to identify with either the Republican or Democratic parties. The principal survey investigators conclude that while these parties encourage religiosity among Protestants, Jews, and Catholics, they are either silent or opposed to religiosity among their own Muslims. Thus, religiosity among American Muslims may not necessarily lead to partisan identification with either party. Rather, high levels of religiosity may lead many of them to identify as Independents. This does not mean that they are less civically engaged or politically active; rather, it means that they feel as though neither party welcomes their high degree of religiosity.

A comparison with the 2001 Project MAPS showed a migration away from the Republican Party in 2004 (Table 12). In 2001, 25 percent of participants identified themselves as Republican, 43 percent as Democrat, and 30 percent as Independent. In 2004, only 12 percent called themselves Republican, while 53 percent identified themselves as Democrats and 33 percent as Independents. The data show a huge movement away from President George W. Bush’s re-election effort and toward Senator John Kerry. The community’s overwhelming support for the Kerry/Edwards ticket and the near lack of support for the Bush/Cheney ticket was mirrored across all demographics. Even among Republicans, the Kerry/Edwards ticket led by a near two-to-one margin, 50 percent to 28 percent.


Table 12: American Muslim party identification and political ideologies (percent) (MAPS 2001, 2004)

Party Identification and Political Ideology	All	African American	South Asian	African	Arabs	Other
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 2001						
Democratic	43.3	59.5	38.2	46.4	32.4	49.3
Independent	30.7	28.0	31.8	23.8	34.9	25.0
Republican	25.1	11.4	28.9	28.6	32.4	25.0
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 2004						
Democratic	53.4	59.7	51.8	63.4	46.6	56.3
Independent	33.0	34.2	34.0	28.2	34.8	26.8
Republican	12.7	4.4	14.2	8.5	17.5	14.7
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 2001						
Liberal	31.2	30.1	38.1	33.3	22.9	31.4
Moderate	41.9	38.9	41.2	30.6	47.7	42.8
Conservative	24.2	27.4	18.9	32.4	27.3	22.7
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 2004						
Liberal	33.3	37.5	34.9	25.6	29.3	35.1
Moderate	44.6	38.2	47.6	43.8	48.2	38.6
Conservative	19.9	23.4	15.5	25.6	20.5	22.3

According to the 2011 Pew study, 70 percent of American Muslims identified as Democratic (46 percent) or leaned Democratic (24 percent). Six percent identified as Republican and 5 percent leaned Republican, while 19 percent identified as Independent. According to Pew, identification with both parties dropped in 2007, with just 7 percent calling themselves Republican and 37 percent calling themselves Democrat. Those claiming to be Independent or belonging to a minor party rose from 31 percent in 2004 to 34 percent in 2007. American Muslims showed a high degree of support for Senator Obama's presidential bid; however, it remains unclear whether this support translated into more support for the Democratic Party or whether they continue to migrate away from both major parties.

Party affiliation was fairly consistent across race and national origin, with a majority of American Muslim subgroups affiliating with the Democratic Party (Figure 13). The lowest level of Republican Party affiliation came from African American and immigrant Muslims. White Muslims and those from Europe were more likely to be affiliated with the Republican Party.

Figure 13: American Muslim party affiliation, by race and national origin



(Pew Research Center 2007)

Table 13 shows that between 2001 and 2004, little changed in relation to how American Muslims described their political ideology. The Pew 2007 survey found that most of them self-identified as “moderates” (39 percent), which was similar to the general public (36 percent). American Muslims were slightly more liberal than the general public (27 percent compared to 22 percent) and less conservative (25 percent compared to 38 percent).

Table 13: American Muslim political ideology (percentage) (MAPS 2001, 2004)

	2001	2004
Progressive/very liberal	9	11
Liberal	18	19
Moderate	36	40
Conservative	19	16
Very conservative	2	2
Libertarian	2	2
Not sure	14	11

Past Voting Behaviors

2000 Presidential Election: American Muslims Support George W. Bush

Governor George W. Bush courted the Muslims in 2000 and was awarded with a strong supportive vote in his favor from Arab and South-Asian Muslims, while African-American Muslims, voted for the former vice president and Democratic candidate Al Gore (D-TN).²² Bush spoke out against the Clinton-era Secret Evidence Act, which made it easier for prosecutors to introduce secret evidence in terrorism-related trials.²³ Gore, who thought that the Muslim vote was guaranteed, did not reach out to the community until two weeks before the election. His effort was seen as too little too late by the community. In addition, his running mate Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT), a fierce supporter of Israel was seen as someone who would be at odds with the community's views was another factor.

The decision by many immigrant Muslims to vote in favor of Bush in 2000 changed by 2004, even though a two-in-three (60 percent) of the community supported the idea that American Muslims should vote as a bloc for president. Slightly more than one-in-three (36 percent) disagreed (MAPS 2004). For 69 percent of American Muslims, the AMT's endorsement of a candidate was important, which suggests that American Muslims can be swayed if the policies are favorable.

2004 Presidential Election: Muslims Reject Bush and Support Kerry

In the 2004 elections, immigrant Muslims shifted their support away from Bush and toward Kerry. Part of this shift was due to specific policies initiated by the Bush administration including the passing of the PATRIOT Act soon after 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, both of which estranged the community. In 2004, American Muslims' overwhelming support for Kerry/Edwards and the near lack of support for Bush/Cheney was mirrored across most demographic identifiers. Ralph Nader received 10 percent of the Muslim vote in 2004 which was slightly down from the 14 percent he had received in 2000. While Kerry obtained 76 percent of the community's support in a hypothetical two-way match-up, he only received 68 percent support when Nader was added. Bush maintained his 7 percent support (Table 14).

Many American Muslims did not vote in the 2004 election although Florida and the Philadelphia metro area were distinctive in that most of their Muslims did vote. Of those that voted, the vast majority voted for Kerry – all except for Florida, where a comparable number of people voted for each candidate.

Table 14: American Muslims and voting behavior (percent) (MAPS 2001, 2004)


Measure of Behavior	Year	All	African American	South Asian	African	Arabs	Other
Registered to vote	2001	78.7	87.7	74.7	74.2	79.2	76.9
	2004	82.6	91.0	78.8	56.9	85.5	88.7
Very likely to vote	2001	85.3	82.7	87.0	85.1	85.4	85.5
	2004	89.2	89.2	90.1	88.2	88.2	88.7
Reported Presidential Vote	2001	86.7	90.4	84.2	81.1	89.5	85.6
	2004	77.1	81.7	81.1	49.3	80.7	84.8
REPORTED VOTE CHOICE							
Gore	2000	36.0	61.4	31.0	35.6	18.1	42.6
Bush		47.6	22.4	57.7	46.6	60.0	40.5
Nader		13.9	13.3	9.3	15.0	19.3	13.3
Other		2.5	2.9	2.0	2.8	2.6	3.6
Kerry	2004	82.3	85.4	86.7	86.8	75.5	79.5
Bush		6.7	4.6	7.7	8.7	5.5	9.2
Nader		10.0	8.2	5.3	4.5	17.5	10.7
Other		1.0	1.8	0.3	0.0	1.5	0.6

2008 Presidential Elections: Muslims Overwhelmingly Support Obama

A 2009 CAIR Survey of American Muslims showed that they overwhelmingly supported Obama’s 2008 presidential bid: 89 percent of those who voted chose Obama, while a mere 2 percent voted for John McCain (R-AZ). The 2011 Pew study reported similar high levels of support. American Muslims voted at lower levels as the general public in 2008 (64 percent compared to 76 percent). However, this reflects an increase in the community’s voter turnout as compared to the 2004 elections, when 58 percent voted (Pew 2011).

In 2009, Obama's historic speech in Cairo to the Muslim world won him strong support among American Muslims, as it was largely interpreted as a sincere effort to be a friend to Muslims. Since then, however, American Muslims have become somewhat skeptical and disappointed with his administration, since the rhetoric has not been matched with concrete policy changes. Nevertheless, according to Pew's 2011 study, 76 percent approved of his performance, a rating that is higher than what he enjoys among the general public (Figure 14). This support has also translated positively into the community's support for the Democratic Party in different states. According to a Gallup Poll, Obama had an 85 percent job approval rating from the American Muslim population within his first 100 days of office.

Figure 14: Approval ratings for President Obama



(Pew Research Center 2011)



American Muslims' Views on Policy

Those trying to determine whether American Muslim public opinion deviates from that of other Americans must understand the former's views. This section therefore examines their views on both domestic and foreign policy issues. American foreign policy in general, but specifically in predominantly Muslim societies, is potentially significant in shaping the community members' opinions.


American Muslims Primarily Concerned About Economy and Domestic Issues

Despite the perception by many Americans that their Muslim counterparts only care about foreign policy issues, the data prove that more American Muslims cited domestic policy as the "most important factor" when deciding their vote (44 percent); 33 percent cited foreign policy.

Like most Americans, American Muslims are concerned about the economy, jobs, and providing for their families. American Muslims also feel that government should do more to assist people in need, given the hard financial hardship and economic circumstances that all Americans face. The community favors a larger government (Figure 15).

Like most Americans, American Muslims are concerned about the economy, jobs, and providing for their families.

Figure 15: Do American Muslims prefer a big or small government?



(Pew Research Center 2007)


As shown in Table 16, American Muslims strongly support social welfare: universal healthcare (96 percent), after-school programs (94 percent), aid to the poor (92 percent), and increased foreign aid (88 percent).

Table 16: American Muslims' favorable stances on social welfare and cultural issues (percent) (MAPS 2004)

Issue Favored	All	African American	South Asian	African	Arabs	Other
SOCIAL WELFARE ISSUES						
Universal healthcare	96.3	97.8	96.3	97.8	96.1	93.5
Eliminating racial discrimination	94.7	96.2	94.4	94.1	94.6	93.5
Stricter environmental laws	94.0	90.3	95.5	94.1	95.9	91.8
Increased after school programs	93.7	93.5	93.2	97.8	94.6	90.5
More aid to poor people	92.4	91.1	94.7	95.6	92.6	85.7
Increased foreign aid	88.4	89.5	89.1	95.6	88.9	79.2
Debt relief for poorer countries	88.2	85.2	89.9	91.9	90.3	81.8
Limits on buying guns	81.1	73.9	84.3	79.6	86.0	74.9
Stronger laws to fight terrorism	68.9	48.0	78.1	85.4	73.8	57.1
More income tax cuts	65.0	57.7	64.6	67.2	72.6	60.6
Requiring fluency in English	52.3	30.2	61.1	56.9	57.9	49.4
Elimination of affirmative action	37.1	21.6	41.6	38.7	43.4	35.9
CULTURAL ISSUES						
Banning sale of pornography	75.8	79.2	73.8	73.5	77.0	74.5
Faith based initiatives	69.9	80.1	67.2	75.7	70.0	57.1
School vouchers	65.6	80.1	61.1	65.4	63.9	58.4
Death penalty	60.8	41.1	66.9	65.4	67.7	58.7
Research on stem cells	59.9	48.8	65.0	52.9	61.2	65.4
Limiting abortions	55.0	53.9	55.0	56.9	58.2	48.9
Ten commandments in public	51.1	50.9	47.4	56.9	55.1	48.9
School prayer	47.9	53.4	45.8	44.9	47.9	46.3
Doctor assisted suicide	31.4	18.3	33.3	34.6	34.6	39.0
Research in cloning	28.2	11.1	35.9	22.6	30.7	33.0
Same sex marriage	15.0	4.6	17.0	5.9	16.3	28.6

When asked if the government should help the needy, the overwhelming majority (close to 80 percent) answered positively. Closely related to this is most Muslims' belief that it is better to have a larger government that provides more services and helps those in need than a small government that provides fewer services and less help for those in need. As illustrated in Figure 16, this was fairly consistent across ethnic and racial lines.


Figure 16: What do American Muslims think about the government helping needy Americans, by race and ethnic background?



(Pew Research Center 2007)

The same pattern was true across the country with the exception of Texas, where Muslims were less likely to support government services to help the needy.

Figure 17: What do American Muslims think about the government helping needy Americans, by state?



(Pew Research Center 2007)


At the local level, Muslims living in and around Los Angeles or Detroit were especially likely to believe that the government should help the needy. In contrast, Muslims in the Washington DC and Philadelphia metro areas were more likely than Muslims elsewhere to prefer a smaller government, although they still prefer a large government over a small one by about two to one. Muslims in Texas are especially likely to reject the idea of big government, as are Muslims in New York, even though those living in New York City are more receptive to the idea.

It should be noted that this support for big government is based on the 2007 Pew study and may have subsequently changed after the 2008 financial crisis.

Data Suggests Increased Acceptance of Homosexuality

When asked in the Pew 2007 survey if homosexuality should be accepted or discouraged, around 60 percent of American Muslims thought it should be discouraged. In 2011, however, this figure had dropped to around 45 percent, with almost 40 percent favoring its acceptance by society (Figure 18). This suggests that American Muslims increasingly identify with other American minority groups and favor social justice and acceptance.

Figure 18: Views on whether or not homosexuality should be accepted



(Pew Research Center 2011)

Muslims in the Washington DC metro area and in Texas, however, were less likely to believe that homosexuality is a way of life that society should accept, while Muslims in Florida are more likely to believe the opposite. Ethnically, non-immigrant Caucasian Americans, Iranians, and


Europeans are all more likely than average to believe that it should be accepted by society. As is often the case, one's level of education also influences acceptance of homosexuality; those American Muslims who had continued schooling after college were more accepting, while those with who had no high school education were less supportive.

Strong Support for Immigrants Among American Muslims

American Muslims expressed strong support for incorporating immigrants, had a positive view of them, and thought that immigration strengthens the country (71 percent); only 22 percent considered them a burden. The general public was split evenly on the subject.

When examining the sample by race, we found that virtually all American Muslims believed that immigration strengthens the country; however, only 50 percent of African American Muslims held this view (Figure 19).

Figure 19: American Muslim views on whether immigrants strengthen or burden the country, by race and ethnic background




(Pew Research Center 2007)

As one might expect, African American Muslims were less certain that immigrants benefit the country than is the rest of the American Muslim population, which is made up primarily immigrants and their children. Interestingly, European immigrant Muslims were more sure that immigrants strengthen the United States than were immigrants overall.

This strong support of immigration and immigrants is not a product of the respondents' level of education, as shown in Figure 20.


Figure 20: American Muslim views on whether immigrants strengthen or burden the country, by education



(Pew Research Center 2007)

While most American Muslims favor immigration, there is some variation by state. Around 60 percent of the Muslims living Pennsylvania, Florida, Ohio, and New Jersey—these states have the lowest support levels for immigration—expressed support for the statement that immigration strengthens the country. At least 75 percent of Muslims living in other states share this belief (Figure 21).

Figure 21: American Muslim views on whether immigrants strengthen or burden the country, by state



(Pew Research Center 2007)

In addition, Muslims in the Washington DC and Los Angeles metro areas were more supportive of immigrants than those living in the Philadelphia metro area or Texas.

American Muslims Believe Changing Policy in Middle East Best to Fight Terrorism

American Muslims overwhelmingly suggested that they would pursue the “war on terror” by changing American foreign policy in the Middle East (76 percent). There was widespread support for Washington backing the creation of a Palestinian state (87 percent). Arab-Americans were more likely to support a policy that encourages a Palestinian state than other ethnic groups (94 percent of Arab-American Muslims). Eighty percent of American Muslims would like Washington to reduce its level of support for Israel; 87 percent supported the idea that the United States must deal with various social, economic, and political inequalities around the world to defeat terrorism; while 66 percent agreed that the country should reduce its support of undemocratic regimes in the Muslim world (Table 17).

Table 17: American Muslims' views on foreign affairs (percent) (MAPS 2004)

Support/Agree	All	African American	South Asian	African	Arabs	Other
Support Afghanistan war	39.7	19.9	47.5	55.2	40.4	41.0
Support Iraq war	13.9	9.4	15.7	16.5	12.9	17.1
Iraq war was worth it	16.0	10.3	17.6	23.3	16.2	16.4
More troops to Iraq	10.7	3.6	12.9	22.6	8.2	13.9
Iraq war could mean more terrorism in the United States	86.7	86.4	87.2	78.1	87.5	89.0
Iraq war could destabilize Middle East	87.6	89.0	87.4	81.7	89.4	85.6
Iraq war will bring democracy to the Middle East	30.7	37.2	30.2	40.0	26.3	26.3
Terrorism is best combated by reducing inequalities in the world	92.7	93.0	92.1	91.4	92.6	94.9
United States should reduce financial support of Israel	89.6	90.9	87.4	80.7	92.1	92.9
United States should support a Palestinian state	94.3	90.8	95.0	93.0	97.0	92.6
United States should reduce support of undemocratic regimes in the Muslim world	76.8	67.0	78.2	82.6	82.0	72.0
Kashmir in central dividing issue between Pakistan and India	77.7	65.6	87.8	66.7	75.6	74.2

As overwhelmingly evident in Table 18, two out of three American Muslims thought that changing American policy in the Middle East would be an effective way to pursue the “war on terror.” No other potential answer gained more than 2 percent; most were less than 1 percent.

Table 18: Percentage of American Muslims who chose the following ONE way to wage the war against terrorism (MAPS 2004)


Changing America's Middle East policy	76%
Using U.S. Military Covert/Special Forces	2%
Use of strategic nuclear weapons	1%
Attacking Iran	1%
Contracting with mercenaries	1%
U.S. Air Force bombing	1%
Biological warfare	1%
None of the above/Other	11%
Not sure	8%

Furthermore, 87 percent felt that the most effective way to battle terrorism was to deal with the social, economic, and political inequalities that affect the majority of the world's population.

When asked if the United States was fighting a "war on terror" or a "war on Islam," 33 percent said "yes" to the first option, 38 percent said "yes" to the second option, and 29 percent said they were not sure (MAPS 2004). Over time, American Muslims have started to see Washington's anti-terror efforts as being more sincere. According to the Pew studies, while 26 percent felt this way in 2007, 43 percent did in 2011.

Although the "war on terror" is a somewhat dated term, concerns about how the United States engages those whom it considers to be "violent extremists" continue to exist. This was fairly consistent across the board, as two-thirds of American Muslims doubt that the "war on terror" was ever a sincere effort to reduce international terror. When broken down by race and ethnic background, the data show that in 2007 African-American Muslims were the most likely to think that such efforts were insincere (Figure 22a). The lowest levels of agreement came from the Philadelphia metro area, where only 11 percent of the respondents believed that such efforts were sincere. Given the pattern of responses in the Philadelphia metro area, it is not surprising that these Muslims were particularly likely to believe that the "war on terror" was not a sincere effort, while their Arab-American counterparts were more likely to believe that it was a sincere effort.

Figure 22a: American Muslims views on whether US effort against terrorism is sincere, by race and ethnic background



(Pew Research Center 2007)

Strong Opposition to Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq

In 2004, American Muslims were more likely to support the war in Afghanistan (35 percent) than the war in Iraq (13 percent). In both cases opposition outweighed support, perhaps largely due to a feeling of distrust of Washington's real goals in both regions: 39 percent said that the United States invaded Iraq to control Middle Eastern oil, 16 percent thought the Bush administration was trying to assert its domination of the Middle East, 16 percent believed it was an effort to protect Israel, and 5 percent said it was an attempt to weaken the Muslim world. Support for military action against Afghanistan fell from 51 percent in 2001 to 35 percent in 2004 (Table 19).


Table 19: American Muslim support or opposition to U.S. military action against Afghanistan and Iraq*

	Support		Oppose	
	2001	2004	2001	2004
U.S. military action against Afghanistan	51	35	43	53
War in Iraq	—	13	—	81

(*Data is missing for Iraq for 2001, since the war started in 2003.)

When we break the numbers down by race and ethnic background in relation to the Afghanistan war, we find the African-American Muslims were the strongest opponents (Figure 22b).


Figure 22b: Opinion on US military action in Afghanistan, by race and ethnicity



(Pew Research Center 2007)

Education seems to play a role in supporting the war in Afghanistan, for a lower level of education translates into higher support (Figure 23).

Figure 23: Opinion on US military action in Afghanistan, by education level




(Pew Research Center 2007)

As noted above, most American Muslims did not consider the use of military force in Afghanistan to be a good idea. At the state level, Muslims in Ohio and New Jersey were significantly less supportive than were American Muslims overall. In sharp contrast, Muslims in Florida and Texas were far more supportive; in fact, majorities in both states believed that it was the right decision.

Not surprisingly, racial undertones were evident. African American Muslims were far less likely to support the use of military force in Afghanistan, whereas the majority of Caucasian non-immigrants, as well as European, Iranian, and South Asian immigrant Muslims supported it.

American Muslims were even less supportive of the use of military force in Iraq. When examining their responses to the decision to invade Iraq, the state-by-state data show that Florida's Muslims had the highest approval rate (around 30 percent) for the decision (Figure 24).

Figure 24: Opinion on US military action in Iraq, by state



(Pew Research Center 2007)

In addition to doubt over whether the decision to invade Iraq was correct, the data reveal that the number of American Muslims who agreed that such a military campaign could lead to more terrorism toward the United States increased from 64 percent (2001) to 78 percent (2004) (MAPS 2001, 2004). Furthermore, 69 percent of respondents in 2001 and 82 percent in 2004 thought that it could lead to more instability in the Middle East and across the Muslim world (MAPS 2001, 2004).


Not surprisingly, African-American Muslims, and therefore most Muslims in the Philadelphia metro area, were especially opposed to this war. Muslims in Los Angeles were also significantly less supportive than Muslims overall.

American Muslims Value Democracy and Stability in the Middle East

Based on the assumption that, at least at the conceptual level, democracy and stability cannot exist without each other, American Muslims were asked whether democracy or stability was more important in the Middle East. Around 45 percent of them chose each option (Pew 2011). This differs from the general American public, which favored stability over democracy (52 percent compared to 37 percent).

Our analysis of the responses by education level reveals that those who are more educated favor democracy over stability (Figure 25). This holds true for American Muslims and the general American public.

Figure 25: Support democracy over stability, by education



(Pew Research Center 2011)

Majority of American Muslims Think Palestine and Israel Can Coexist


Senator Obama campaigned heavily on his desire for a more balanced, even-handed, American foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He focused on efforts to advance the idea of social justice and even acknowledged the Palestinians' suffering. His decision in September 2011 to veto the Palestinian proposal for membership in the United Nations was, therefore, disappointing to many American Muslims.

Despite this, he remains more balanced in the eyes of most American Muslims, especially when compared to his Republican counterparts. The community came out strongly against Republican presidential hopeful Newt Gingrich after his interview with the Jewish Channel, in which he called the Israeli-Palestinian peace process "delusional" and said the Palestinians are "an invented" people.

This conflict remains one of the country's most contentious foreign policy positions. When asked whether they supported Washington's backing for a Palestinian state, 87 percent of American Muslims agreed with the premise. Such support is quite similar across all geographic regions.

When asked in both 2007 and 2011 whether Palestine and Israel can coexist, at least 60 percent of American Muslims agreed that they could (Figure 26).

Figure 26: Views on whether Israel and Palestine can coexist, by year



Pew Research Center 2011

American Muslims continued to be optimistic in this regard, with about 80 percent believing that a fair resolution was possible. There were, however, differences across geographic lines as well as among various ethnic and racial subgroups.

Geographically, the Detroit and the Washington DC metro areas were distinctive: only a little more than half of their Muslims believed that a just solution was possible. In contrast, over 90 percent of Muslims in the Los Angeles metro area, Florida, and Ohio believed that a just solution was possible.

As regards ethnic and racial subgroups, the belief that a just solution is possible was more common among Iranian, European, and South Asian immigrants than among the overall American Muslim population. African and Arab immigrant Muslims, in contrast, were significantly less likely to believe that a just solution is possible (although most still believed that a just solution can be found).

American Muslims are Generally Satisfied with Direction of the Country


Despite their differences of opinion with many governmental policies, community members have a generally favorable outlook on life in the United States and want to be part of the mainstream.

When asked in 2001 about the direction in which the country was heading, 59 percent expressed satisfaction; this had declined to 35 percent by 2004. The level of dissatisfaction actually soared from 38 percent (2001) to 63 percent (2004).

The 2004 MAPS study found that around 60 percent of American Muslims were dissatisfied with the way things were going in society, yet a majority of them considered this a good time to be a Muslim in the country.

Most respondents did not think there was a conflict between being Muslim and living in a modern society. Interestingly, Muslims living in the Chicago and Washington DC metro areas were even less likely than the national average to believe this. European immigrant respondents were far more likely than the general American Muslim population to believe that any such conflict exists. African Americans were also more likely than average to believe that there was a conflict. In contrast, Caucasian Muslims were less likely than average to believe that there is a conflict.

Figure 27: Percentage of Muslims who were satisfied with the direction of the country, by race and ethnic background



(Pew Research Center 2007)

As we can see from the figure above, African American and Caucasian Muslims showed the lowest levels of satisfaction with the country (13 percent and 28 percent, respectively). Given this fact, it is not surprising that Muslims in the Philadelphia metro area are not very satisfied with the way things were going in the country (only 18 percent of them reported being satisfied), since Pennsylvania is home to a high number of African American Muslims.

FLORIDA: A Case Study

This section explores Florida's Muslim population as a voting constituency and assesses its potential impact on the upcoming 2012 presidential election. To examine this case effectively, the section is divided into two major subsections: (1) Florida's Muslim voters and (2) the "Emerge USA" campaign and its impact on mobilizing them to increase voter turnout and efficacy.

Florida, a relatively diverse state, is considered a key battleground state in presidential elections.²⁵ Although American Muslims are the "new kids on the block," they have managed to form organizations and influence local elections. Emerge USA, an organization founded initially in southern Florida, is headed by a group of influential Muslims. Chief among them is Khurram Wahid, a southern Florida attorney and cofounder of the Florida Muslim Bar Association. Originally known as the Center of Voter Advocacy in 2006, it eventually became Emerge USA and is now a statewide organization with chapters nationwide. Its mission statement proclaims that the organization seeks to "uphold the same constitutional rights for underrepresented communities as the mainstream enjoy."²⁶ This non-partisan non-profit organization focuses on the Muslim community; informs and watchdogs political organizations; and encourages these communities to engage in the political process at the local, state and national levels.

The American Muslim vote helped Kerry in 2004 in many swing states like Florida, and contributed 65,000 votes that helped put Bush over the top in 2000 in Florida.²⁷ As such, Florida's minorities are significant, as their vote might be the deciding factor as regards which candidate wins or loses.

Florida Muslims and the 2012 Presidential Election

Florida has been in the national spotlight since the 2000 election debacle, when the Supreme Court of the United States had to weigh in on which candidate officially captured its electoral votes and won the election. That year, the outcome was determined by a mere 537 votes.²⁸ The voting percentage among registered Floridian voters that year was around 60 percent, which matched the national average.²⁹ Florida has shown that it is a swing state with a large number of electoral votes that can easily upset an election.

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Florida, out of all swing states, has the closest margin between Republicans and Democrats. This margin favored Republicans in 2000 (0.01 percent) and 2004 (1 percent); in 2008, however, it favored Democrats (2 percent).³⁰ A natural bastion of conservatism, the state has traditionally been linked with the Republican Party. Historically, it was a Confederate state that got caught up in the neoconservative Republicans' hold after the South's disaffection with the Democratic Party's support of the civil rights movement. Congressmen like Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) led the conservative movement out of the Democratic Party and Republican vice president Richard Nixon's southern strategy in 1968 secured it for the Republican Party.³¹


Even though Florida has a conservative and Republican history, the South seems to be changing, as the 2008 presidential election made quite clear. Obama won three out of the eleven former Confederate states. This considerable amount of change can be attributed to several factors, among them its becoming more metropolitan and ethnically diverse, along with an increase in jobs and population, since the 1980s. There has been a subsequent increase in the number of African-American voters, young voters, and metropolitan voters. Many people from other regions have been moving south, including those living in states that traditionally vote Democratic. Florida preempted this southern swing toward metropolitanism with the rise of southern Florida. Obama won several metropolitan areas, and some of them (e.g., Tampa and Orlando) are changing the general dynamic of state. This dynamic has caused it to become an evenly matched swing state.³²

Along with its increasing population, Florida's growth has been steadily increasing the state's diversity.³³ For example, its Muslim population has been increasing since the 1980s.³⁴ Although there are no statistics on the demographic composition of Florida's Muslims, Nezar Hamze, executive director of CAIR in southern Florida, maintains that they are predominantly immigrant, middle and working class, and well-educated.³⁵ This reflects national data on the Muslim community, and thus there is no indication that Florida is unique in this respect.

The state's Muslims are becoming more politically active, despite the fact that many are not registered to vote. Emerge USA's voter registration database contains a total of 123,759 registered Muslim voters. Based on previous national elections, this electorate is large enough to swing the vote to whichever party receives most of its votes. But the total number, although quite comprehensive, might not include all registered Muslim voters, namely, those without Muslim-sounding names, converts, and some African-American Muslims.³⁶ Given these figures, the community's potential voting power is quite significant.


As mentioned earlier, the South has been changing demographically and politically due largely to its growing metropolitan areas. In Florida, registered Muslim voters are concentrated in these areas: they make up over 1 percent of the voting population in the counties of Orange (Orlando), Osceola (Kissimmee), and Broward (Ft. Lauderdale). The three counties where they make up less than 0.15 percent of the voting population are Glades, Lafayette, and Lee. The first two are predominantly rural and non-metropolitan (Figure 28 and Figure 29).³⁷

Figure 28: Top ten counties with highest proportion of Muslim vote



(Emerge USA)


Figure 29: Top ten counties with lowest proportion of Muslim vote



(Emerge USA)

Large numbers of Muslims have turned out to vote in recent elections. When Emerge USA asked its database’s registered Muslim voters if they were voting in the 2010 mid-term elections, more than 60 percent reported that they were at least “likely to vote.” Including only those who were certain they were voting, almost 50 percent confirmed that they would vote. At the very least this is in line with the state’s general population, in which 48 percent of registered voters actually voted in the 2010 mid-term elections.³⁸ Including those “likely to vote,” the Muslim electorate is far more active than the average Florida voter (Figure 30).³⁹

Figure 30: Florida Muslim voter turnout for 2010 mid-term elections




(Emerge USA, 2010)

Muslim voters in Florida offer a potential opportunity of bloc voting for candidates at the local, state, and national levels. Any political party that recognizes the community's needs and addresses them will potentially gain the Muslim vote. Hamze, who was asked about the political party courting the Muslim vote in Florida, explained that

"The Democratic Party has been very active with the Muslim community. The Democratic Party is very engaged and interestingly enough, I am a registered Republican. The reason why is because the social conservatism of the Republican party mirrors Muslim principles, really the only thing Democrats bring to the Muslim community is the protection of minority rights. The Republican Party rejects the Muslim community. It's all about the conspiracy of the Muslim community taking over. It is good for the Muslim community not to be monolithic with party affiliation. The majority of the Muslim vote is Democratic. I vote Democratic despite my party status. A majority of Muslims would vote for Ron Paul if they didn't focus on the name Republican. Focus on what he says and what he does. I have applied to be on the Broward Republican Executive Committee and you should see the craziness because of that."⁴⁰

Emerge USA asked Muslim voters about the importance of party affiliation. In reply, 78 percent said it was "somewhat important," 33 percent thought it was "always important," and 22 percent said it was just "important." These numbers are relatively high, meaning that Florida's Muslims are not Independents and are willing to select a party affiliation. Various studies on minority political behavior suggest that party identification is a significant predictor of voting behavior. It is interesting to note that Hamze is a registered Republican but votes Democratic because the Democratic Party has done a much better job of engaging the national Muslim community despite differences in social conservatism (Figure 31).⁴¹


Figure 31: Importance of party affiliation for Florida Muslim voters



(Emerge USA, 2010)

The Republican Party is not at a complete loss with the community. Besides their social conservatism, Florida Muslims have specific issues that are important to them. Emerge USA found that 48 percent considered the most important issues to be the economy and jobs, 17 percent were concerned with education, and 15 percent were concerned with foreign policy and health care, respectively. The remaining 5 percent was concerned with the environment. Their priorities were confirmed by Hamze’s description of small business policies, taxes, and education as being the most important issues for Florida Muslim voters.⁴² The community’s concern matched those of the general American population (Figure 32).⁴³

Figure 32: Issues of importance to Florida Muslim voters



(Emerge USA, 2010)

Islamophobia is the chief element in defining American Muslims as a disenfranchised group. Therefore, anyone who identifies as a Muslim at any level will move closer to a group consciousness that will orient the Muslim vote toward the party that seeks to empower this group.

Islamophobia is flourishing in Florida. Just in 2010 alone, Pastor Terry Jones of Dove Outreach Center (Gainesville) had a “Burn a Quran” day; a Jacksonville mosque was pipe-bombed; and Joe Kaufman, founder of Americans against Hate, lobbied for a Muslim Florida Atlantic University professor to be fired while staging protests throughout southern Florida against mosques and organizations. All of these events register with the community, and their frequency constantly reminds its members that they are hated, feared, and mocked. This potent cocktail can either push a community to force its way to the top or to disappear altogether.

Tea Party caucus member Allen West (R-FL) once said that “a nation goes to war against an ideology. We are against something that is a totalitarian, theocratic, political ideology and it is called Islam.”⁴⁴ This type of comment is becoming more prevalent in the mainstream Republican Party. David Muller Jr. (2011) noted that conservatives, who typically vote Republican, see Islam, much like they did communism, as a countercivilization to the West.⁴⁵ It is unknown if those anti-communists who are now the anti-Islamists or Islamophobes will be able to unite conservatives under its banner. The spread of anti-Shariah legislation and the spread of Republican congressmen/women running on an anti-Islam platform might be an indication that this is happening. If this trend continues, Muslims will most likely vote entirely Democratic, for they will feel more and more isolated by the Republican Party.

Hamze described southern Florida as being very heavy with anti-Muslim organizations. He felt that if the Muslims living there begin gaining legitimacy, then this must be happening far more frequently in other parts of the country. In this, southern Florida and Florida as a whole become another type of battleground as Muslims attempt to gain public legitimacy in the United States.⁴⁶

Given the potential state Democratic Party’s long-term gains in votes from mobilized group-conscious Muslims living there, another religious minority also has to be considered. The state’s Jewish minority, which is numerically second only to that of New York, makes up between 4 to 5 percent of the registered voters.⁴⁷ Jews have traditionally voted Democratic since 1924; twenty-one elections later, they were still voting solidly Democratic.⁴⁸ In 2008, Obama captured 78 percent of the national Jewish vote.⁴⁹ But what if the Democratic Party is perceived as aligning itself with Muslims?

In the 2010 mid-term election for Florida’s 22nd Congressional district, Allen West (R) and Ron Klein (D) each tried to outdo the other in showing support for Israel.⁵⁰ Klein lost the election by a landslide in a heavily Jewish district.⁵¹ Charles Blow (2010) has found that the once-strong Jewish support for Democrats is starting to wane because of its perceived less-than-enthusiastic

support for Israel. According to him, in 2008 one-third of all Jewish voters supported Obama; now, only one-half of them do. He cited Obama's attempt to "woo" the Muslim world as a major factor in this loss of support. Blow (2010) also cited a Republican polling firm's claim that only 42 percent of American Jews intended to vote for Obama in 2012. That would be a loss of 36 percent of the Jewish vote.⁵² If this national data applies to Florida, then the offset in the Jewish vote (viz., a decrease of 1.8 percent of the general vote) would not be met by an equal increase in the registered Muslim vote even if all of them were to vote for Obama.

There is contradictory evidence of this supposed Jewish flight. In June 2011, a Gallup Poll found that 60 percent of American Jews still approve of Obama, which is far higher than the general 46 percent of the American adult population. Among Jewish Democrats in particular, 86 percent still approve of Obama. The more conservative Jews and those who are politically active, however, are less supportive.⁵³ This contradicts Blow's (2010) data. If Jewish voters are like Muslim voters, namely, concerned primarily with jobs and education and are less involved with foreign policy concerns, then they will coexist within the Democratic Party. The data in the Gallup poll may suggest this reality. As evidenced by Figure 32 above, Muslims in Florida are concerned primarily with domestic policy.

Among minorities, the Jewish, Hispanic, and African-American vote is expected to be relatively solid for the Democrats in 2012. The state's large minority population will contribute significantly to the vote to reelect Obama. As noted earlier, the Caucasian vote still makes up a majority of the electorate; however, as a proportion of the population, minorities have far better turn outs. Muslims are no different. The concern is that Muslims will not be organized enough to have any real impact. The rise of Islamophobia is accelerating a group consciousness, yet the lack of a real leadership hinders the Muslims' potential to have any serious public presence. Emerge USA has been working as one leader of the Muslim electorate. The report's next section focuses on this organization and its impact/role in mobilizing Florida's Muslims.

EMERGE USA: Its Leadership and Activities

Love (2009) recommended that the best means to confront Islamophobia is to switch from focusing on education and culture to political lobbying and judicial activism.⁵⁴ The Muslim community has been realizing this slowly and establishing institutions to accomplish this task. In Florida organizations like the Center for Voter Advocacy, which is a political action committee (PAC), has started to lobby and support certain politicians. This organization has worked to "create relationships with elected officials throughout the state of Florida."⁵⁵

Wahid, the vice-chair of Emerge USA, recalled the creation of its precursor, the Center for Voter Advocacy, in which he pointed out that the PAC started by supporting Keith Ellison (DFL-MN), the first Muslim elected to Congress.⁵⁶ Although Ellison was a Congressional candidate from Minnesota, the involvement of Florida's community in supporting him helped move it closer

to the political arena. No Muslim has stood for election in Florida yet.

Wahid stated that he established Emerge USA in 2009⁵⁷ when he realized that it was not enough just to “funnel” money toward the candidates they supported. There was, in his opinion, a profound need to educate the community on how policy is created and how individual Muslims can make a difference and have an impact at the lowest level.⁵⁸

Farooq Mitha, who worked briefly as its executive director and now advises the organization, mentioned that it was started with “the intent of creating an institutional presence for certain underrepresented communities in the political process.” He described how 9/11 really disenfranchised the American Muslim community and increased its need for an “institutional presence not focused on one person, not focused on one religion or ethnic group.” Furthermore, he revealed that one of its objectives, developing a sustained presence meant to further political engagement, has led to a determination of “three tracks which are voter turnout, data collection and leadership development.”⁵⁹

Nauman Abbasi, Emerge USA’s executive director, confirmed Mitha’s statement by including the need to represent underrepresented communities. He asserted that the organization’s goal is to “mainstream them into politics. We want them to channel their political voice.”⁶⁰

In line with its three tracks, Emerge USA engages in activities designed to increase voter turnout, data collection, and leadership development. Wahid describes its efforts to get out the vote in three steps: (1) consulting the phone bank that utilizes Emerge USA’s developing database on Muslim voters, (2) increasing the organization’s visibility, which he terms “branding,” and (3) developing partnerships outside the Muslim community, which he sees as being critical for the upcoming 2012 election.⁶¹

Laila Abdelaziz (Central Florida Field Organizer, Emerge USA) added that the best way to increase Muslim voter turnout is to present the organization, ensure its transparency, and get its board members involved. She noted that its receptivity to feedback has already gained it a certain level of legitimacy in the community. In addition, she has expressed her admiration of the organization’s volunteers, who she credits with really getting out the vote, and applauds how they go “above and beyond the call of duty” to get people involved in politics and in their community.⁶²

When asked about Emerge USA’s get-out-the-vote strategies, Abbasi responded in a similar manner by citing the role of mosques and the organization’s voter registration effort. He was confident that this latter effort, as well as robo-calling, would increase Muslim voter turnout.⁶³

According to its website, Emerge USA has engaged in voter registration campaigns, absentee ballot drives, and early voting events. In June 2010 it conducted a statewide voter registration

day. In October 2010, it persuaded 500 voters to vote early on an early voting day. As Abbasi, Wahid, and Abdelaziz have remarked, they utilize their database to interact with registered Muslim voters either through social networking sites, email, or phone. In 2010, they contacted 100,000 voters through live and automated calls.⁶⁴

The second track is data collection. The data on Muslim voters presented in the previous section was provided by Emerge USA. Regular polls, as well as simply collecting data on the number of Muslim voters, are conducted. For example, one poll asked Muslim voters if they felt that Broward County's public education system should recognize the Eid holidays. Another poll asked about Miami's 2011 special election and whether Muslim voters in that county had voted.⁶⁵ Much of the polling data asks about voting habits, as the last example makes clear.

Emerge USA uses its data to develop bridges among the community and elected leaders. Abdelaziz described how it utilized this data for its February 2011 seminar on the Florida Muslim community, which many members of the State Legislature in Tallahassee attended. She shared that many politicians had already known about this organization, but that many did not. The data on Emerge USA's website was used in the seminar.⁶⁶

Wahid termed the seminar a source of education for elected officials, for "We are doing a lot to educate the elected officials. We did a seminar in February at the capitol building in Tallahassee, and we did a one-hour presentation on the demographics of the Muslim, Arab and South Asian community in Florida. How many there are and geographically where are they, and in which districts they represent a large chunk of the population. We also told them how this community views different issues. They think they just have to come out to us and talk about civil rights. Well the truth is that civil rights came in like seventh in a list of issue priorities when we surveyed the Muslim community. Number one was the economy. I think there is a lot of educating we need to do and this is one of our challenges."⁶⁷

This data is being collected not only to mobilize the community, but also to educate elected officials. It is therefore being actively pursued and efforts are underway to make it even more accurate and expansive in the future. Mitha expressed this by holding out hope that the organization's data will be used in the same manner as that belonging to such polling organizations as Gallup. He realized this will require many more resources than the organization currently has.⁶⁸

The third track is the leadership development initiative. When asked why such efforts as Emerge USA have developed in Florida, Mitha responded that this was due, in part, to the people involved. He noted that it is personality driven and that people like Wahid and himself really got the ball rolling.⁶⁹ Similarly, he noted the need to train a younger generation that would outlast the current leadership.⁷⁰ The importance of these necessary personalities in the organization's current success was confirmed by Siobhan Harley (special assistant to the

mayor of Tampa), who pointed to the leadership's prior relationship (particularly Mitha and Wahid) with Bob Buckhorn (D), the current mayor.⁷¹

Wahid and Mitha, both of whom are well aware of this situation, have developed the third track: developing leaders. The organization's new Emerging Leaders Program plans to hold leadership training classes statewide to create a leadership capacity among young community members. Many of them will be channeled toward internships designed to impart the tools needed to participate in the political process. The leadership training program involves elected officials, policymakers, civic leaders, and other professional trainers. The intention is to create new leaders in the community.⁷²

As described above, Emerge USA primarily focuses on informing/educating the American Muslim community as well as mobilizing its members for political action. One means of doing this is through emails. Between July 22, 2010 and September 10, 2011, the organization sent 39 emails to people on its email database. In general terms, one email was sent each week leading up to the 2010 mid-term elections and about twice a week thereafter to inform recipients about voter registration, volunteer needs and appreciations, candidate forums, and phone banking reports. The listing, although not entirely comprehensive, does include most of the major items that were mentioned more than once. The only exception was a seminar that was held only once. The emails primarily focused on the organization's internal news, namely, individuals who received internships, events in which it was involved, and other noteworthy items.

The second-most frequently included type of information was news items of which the community should be aware. For example, on May 30, 2011, an email sent by Emerge USA outlined a controversial voter law passed in Florida for the stated purpose of limiting voter fraud but that could, in actuality, make voting more difficult.⁷³

Upcoming events (mainly outlining its coming activities) and survey information (results and calls for participation in polls) tied for third place. An email sent on September 8, 2010, contained poll results of an online survey regarding the year's primary elections. The poll showed increases in voter turnout, which led staff to conclude that the state's Muslim community was increasing its political presence.⁷⁴

Other items appeared less frequently, such as seminar announcements, phone banking information, and calls to contact elected leaders. For example, an email on December 23, 2010, asked community members to contact the mayor and the city council members of Plantation and Lauderhill, who were passing or set to pass resolutions that opposed the Park 51 Islamic Center in New York City.⁷⁵ Although Plantation passed a resolution, Lauderhill did not and actually tabled it. When contacted, Mayor Richard Kaplan (D) responded that the resolution had been tabled and that he had received many emails expressing concern. This was mostly due to Emerge USA's effort.⁷⁶

According to its website, the organization has been very successful in building a good relationship between the state's Muslim American community and elected officials. They point to political appointments, increased input into policy, and the attendance of elected officials and candidates at Emerge USA events. Their efforts, which included the three tracks above, have paid off. For example, 23,000 Muslims were contacted through phone banking in one day during Florida's 2008 and 2010 campaigns. Staff have been registering Muslim Americans to vote while collecting polling data on voting habits so that the organization can serve as an interface between this community and elected officials and candidates. Emerge USA totes Tampa's municipal election as exemplifying its successful efforts to mobilize the community; 60 percent of the community's voters turned out, whereas only 22 percent of the general population did.⁷⁷ Harley recognized this successful effort when she was asked if Emerge USA was doing a good job in mobilizing Muslims for political action. In this context, she said that the mayoral election in Tampa saw "more Muslims coming out and voting. It helped pushed us over the edge."⁷⁸ Bob Buckhorn, who was actively supported by the Muslim vote, won the mayoral race by a large margin.

Based on the successes of Emerge USA and the data collected, there can be little doubt that it has had an impact on mobilizing and informing the community. Mitha stated that the impact has been profound, because there is now an organization that communicates with people who have not heard from anyone before. Now they are receiving calls from volunteers, which encourages them to vote.⁷⁹

Wahid confidently stated that Emerge USA has generated, on average, a 10 percent higher voter turnout among those targeted than with the rest of the society. Moreover, "it is fair to say we have done a good job at trying to create a sense in the community that it is not just about voting but about building the next generation of leadership where we are running people from our own community into public office." He noted that this will help change the Islamophobic perspective toward Muslims.⁸⁰

The successes and impacts of Emerge USA have certainly not been easy; in fact, they continue to be an uphill struggle. Several common and unique problems make it quite difficult to get the community involved in politics. Among those in the first group are apathy and generally low participation levels in the American-style democratic process. When asked if she felt that the community needed to be more involved with the electoral process, Harley responded that she felt that this would apply to any group.⁸¹ Another common problem is a lack of resources, as well as a general lack of knowledge and how to vote in a way that makes one's vote count.⁸²

Among those problems in the second group are, according to Mitha, the community's fairly decentralized nature, which makes it difficult to find the right person to talk to,⁸³ as well as the reluctance to get involved in politics due to experiences in their native lands. Many Muslims come from non-democratic countries where such involvement is discouraged and possibly

dangerous.⁸⁴ This worry carries over to this country, for example, the possibility of losing non-profit status for mosques. Moreover, Muslim political involvement has been discouraged by some Islamophobic organizations and individuals that demonize any Muslim who seeks office or gets involved politically.⁸⁵ One other unique problem is the belief by some within the community that such involvement is *haram* (religiously forbidden).⁸⁶ These challenges are not insurmountable. In fact, Abdelaziz testified she has seen these barriers breaking down in the last 9 months that she has held her current position.⁸⁷

Most Emerge USA staff members are fairly optimistic and have grand visions for the organization's future and that of the state's community. Wahid observed that in the next five to ten years, Emerge USA will be crucial in moving the community into the political mainstream of politics. During the same time period, he also expects it to expand into other states. The movement already exists in Texas, and there is hope that will appear in Pennsylvania and other swing states.⁸⁸

Abdelaziz foresaw many things for the organization: increased financial stability by relying on donations as well as grants and memberships, the development of its recently started leadership program, and an improved data collection process due to its becoming more clean and regular. In addition, she predicted better relations with the state's elected officials and potentially the appearance of a Muslim candidate winning an election.⁸⁹

Almost all staff felt confident that their work would result in a larger voter turnout in the 2012 presidential election. Abdelaziz felt it would be a true test of Emerge USA's ability to get Muslims out to vote, and that the turnout would be much higher in 2012 – potentially high enough to tip the balance in Florida's very political environment. Wahid and Mitha were a little more hesitant in this regard. Wahid felt that it might be numerically higher but remain the same percentage wise in comparison with 2008. Mitha, a little less certain than this, was optimistic.

The results of the staff's hard work have been materializing both for Emerge USA and the state's Muslim community. Their effort seem to be driven by two core objectives: eliminating Islamophobia in the country and gaining greater acceptance. The realization that something must be done may be creating the group consciousness needed to create a unified Muslim voice and Emerge USA, along with other organizations across the country, has real potential to give that movement a voice.

Emerge USA staff remain optimistic that 2012 will reflect American Muslims' greater involvement and more noticeable impact. If these materialize, then the community's future, especially in this particular swing state, will be much brighter. But whatever the result, many individuals and organizations, Emerge USA include, are committed to ensuring a place for Muslims in the United States.

MICHIGAN: A Case Study

Michigan hosts the largest number of Muslims and Arab Americans in the country. Muslim immigrants started arriving in the early years of the twentieth century for economic reasons, mainly to work in the automobile industry.⁹⁰

Given the apparent tie in popularity between Obama and the Republican frontrunner Mitt Romney, Michigan is considered a swing state in the 2012 presidential elections. The competition for votes, which will only intensify in the coming months, will center on the economy, the automobile industry, and various issues that matter to Independents. As demonstrated above, American Muslims care greatly about the state of the economy. Coupled with the fact that Michigan's Muslim community is traditionally working class, they will become more and more valuable as we proceed.

Due to the great diversity of the community nationwide, the issues that concern Michigander Muslims may differ slightly from those Muslims residing in other states. Exploring this population will be critical in the 2012 presidential election, especially when taking into account that the opinions of Midwesterners are more-or-less the closest approximation of what the country as a whole thinks about certain issues.

For this section, MAPOS Michigan data will be explored to examine the Michigander Muslim population's political views and level of engagement and political participation.


Diversity of the American Muslim Community in Michigan

Michigan was one of the 22 sites that MAPOS surveyed between December 2006 and December 2008. Conducted in the Detroit metro area, which is heavily inhabited by American Arab Muslims and Christians, its 96 respondents answered questions related to demographics, level of religiosity, and civic and political participation.

Figure 33 shows the community's racial make-up. Since this information was collected in Detroit, Arabs were the highest percentage of respondents, followed by South Asians. The American Muslim population is even more diverse than this data suggests, as the Arab Americans are overrepresented.

Due to the great diversity of the community nationwide, the issues that concern Michigander Muslims may differ slightly from those Muslims residing in other states.

Figure 33: Racial composition of Muslims in Michigan



(2006-2008 MAPOS)


Is Islam Compatible with the American Political System?

The MAPOS survey asked the respondents if they thought that the teachings of Islam and the American political system were compatible. Thirty percent replied that they were “very much” compatible, and 28 percent replied “somewhat” compatible. Thus a total of 58 percent saw a certain degree of compatibility, whereas 14 percent saw no compatibility between them at all (Figure 34).

Given the current political environment, various issues of concern to the state’s community will overlap many of their foreign policy concerns, from the question of Palestine to the Arab Spring, from Afghanistan to American policies in the Middle East and the rest of the Muslim world.

In addition, the element of religiosity must also be studied. MAPOS asked respondents about the level of their religiosity and if belief in Islam is compatible with the American political system.

Figure 34: Are Islamic teachings compatible with participation in the American political system?




(2006-2008 MAPOS)

Level of Political Participation:

MAPOS inquired about the respondents' level of political participation and established an index of political acts on a scale of "0 political acts" to the maximum of "4 political acts": writing a letter to a public official, participated in protest or rally, participated in a community meeting, and donated to a public candidate/campaign. Broken down by age, based on the fact that relatively older people tend to participate more, Figure 35 shows the extent of community members' political participation. When compared with other minority groups in the United States, the American Muslim community is relatively more active.

This data suggest similar patterns with those of the larger American population, such as the older people get, the more involved they tend to be. Yet even among relatively young American Muslims, political participation is high when compared to their peers in other groups. This indicates that the community's young members understand the overall significance of politics.


Figure 35: Acts of political participation by age



(2006-2008 MAPOS)

When we explore the level of political participation further, we find that American Muslim women in the state are more politically active than their male counterparts, as shown in Figure 36. This contradicts the stereotype that the former take a back seat when it comes to political activity. In fact, they have been a driving force in their communities, an assertion that this data fully supports.

Figure 36: Acts of political participation by gender




(2006-2008 MAPOS)

Education has been shown to increase the level of political participation among all Americans. The state’s community is no exception in this regard, as shown in Figure 37.

American Muslims in general tend to be highly educated. Since a higher level of education translates into a higher level of participation, then this community is at a higher level of participation to begin with. This is true even in the absence of other mechanisms that can increase participation.


Figure 37: Acts of political participation by educational attainment



(2006-2008 MAPOS)

When we analyze the level of political participation according to the immigrant status, we find that the second and third generation American Muslims are the most politically active. This is consistent with other studies on the political participation of immigrants and their descendants. The longer individuals live in the United States, the more they participate in politics (Figure 38).

Figure 38: Acts of political participation by generation




(2006-2008 MAPOS)

Mosque Involvement and Political Participation:

MAPOS examines the level of mosque involvement beyond going there to pray the Friday congregational and other prayers. This mechanism explores the respondents' level of commitment to their religious institutions for purposes other than worship.

The results suggest that those who are involved to a greater extent in non-worship mosque-related activities are significantly more likely to report engaging in multiple acts of political participation (Figure 39).

Figure 39: Acts of political participation by level of mosque involvement



(2006-2008 MAPOS)

The Michiganders who can “Swing the State”:

As shown in this section, members of Michigan’s community are very politically active. Therefore, as the competition continues to intensify for the 2012 presidential election, various minorities there will play a very important role in determining its outcome. Muslim Michiganders are there to be cultivated. By campaigning at local mosques and cultural centers, presidential hopefuls just might find that American Muslims are the voting bloc that can help them win the state.

Policymakers and strategists have always been interested in determining why a campaign succeeds or fails. Understanding the potential of American Muslims to help them achieve victory might encourage candidates to design strategies that would attract the critical votes of a swing states’ minority populations.

Conclusion

This report shows that American Muslims are invested in the United States, increasingly engaged in its political process, and have a real stake in its future. Although a substantial portion of them are of immigrant origin, a growing number identify as “American” and desire to be politically active. As second- and third-generation immigrant Muslims mature and reach voting age, the community is becoming far more sophisticated in its effort to bring about political change.

Several national surveys on American Muslims were utilized to analyze this minority population’s level of political participation. Rather than relying on anecdotal evidence, a decade’s worth of survey data on Muslim political incorporation and mobilization over the past decade was reviewed. Several results stand out: American Muslims as a group are gaining political self-identity and flexing their political muscles, there is a noticeable connection between one’s level of political participation and level of religiosity, and that a higher level of religiosity and mosque activism leads to a higher level of political participation.

Moving beyond the national data, the report presents case studies of the Muslim communities in the swing states of Florida and Michigan. Two conclusions have been drawn: (1) in the traditional swing state of Florida, the community has the potential of becoming a powerful voting bloc that might just be able to change the outcome of future elections at the national and local level; and (2) in Michigan, home to the country’s largest Muslim population, the data on its community suggests that Muslims are an active part of politics in the state.

In sum, this report highlights this fledgling community’s increased potential and provides insight into how candidates might cultivate better relations with its members. As minority votes become increasingly important, the data in this report suggest that the American Muslim community can be a pivotal player for some candidates in key swing states. The recent shifts in demographics and continued population growth of minority groups are making them increasingly important in American politics. As these shifts continue, *all* minority groups will become even more important.

This report shows that American Muslims are invested in the United States, increasingly engaged in its political process, and have a real stake in its future.

Recommendations

1. *Provide Resources to Further Mobilize the Community:* The empirical evidence suggests that American Muslims are increasingly active and civically engaged citizens. Although their level of political incorporation and mobilization has increased over the past decade, the community as a whole is still not as engaged as it could be. For example, some levels of involvement trail behind those of the general public, including the percentage that is active members of a political party or that contributes to political campaigns. Community organizers need to provide the information and resources needed to help motivate and mobilize the community further.
2. *Tap into Active Segments of Community:* Nationally, African American Muslims were found to be most active in almost all categories of political participation, compared to immigrant Muslims. In addition, state level data in Michigan showed high political engagement by women and young people. Community organizers and political strategists should tap into these highly active subgroups to lead their communities.
3. *Engage with Mosque Communities:* Evidence suggests that higher levels of religiosity and mosque attendance lead to higher levels of political participation. This can be seen in mosque participants' higher voting levels, increased awareness of the issues, writing to their representatives, engaging peacefully in political protest, and other indicators of political activity. Candidates, political leaders, and community organizers looking to reach out Muslim voters should reach out to the mosque leadership and active members.
4. *Speak to the Issues that Concern American Muslims:* The American Muslim community can be cultivated for either a Republican or a Democratic candidate, particularly in such swing states as Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Florida. This report highlights evidence that candidates can build better relations with the community by demonstrating awareness of those issues of most concern to community members.

APPENDIX A

Summary of Quantitative Survey (MAPS 2001, 2004)

Sample Characteristics

Sample Characteristics	Frequency		Valid Percent*	
	2001	2004	2001	2004
Sample size	1781	1846	100	100
REGION				
East	685	672	39	36
South	380	423	21	23
Central/Great Lakes	486	482	27	26
West	229	269	13	15
VOTER REGISTRATION				
Registered to vote	1399	1521	79	82
Not registered to vote	378	320	21	17
Not sure if registered	—	5	—	0
VOTER LIKELIHOOD				
Very likely to vote	1182	1338	85	88
Somewhat likely to vote	126	107	9	7
Not likely to vote	77	55	6	4
Not sure of voting likelihood	—	20	—	1
PARTY IDENTIFICATION				
Democrat	518	721	40	50
Republican	300	171	23	12
Independent/Minor party	367	445	28	31
Libertarian	9	12	1	1
Not sure of party	—	97	—	7
IDEOLOGY				
Progressive/very liberal		204		11
Liberal		340		19
Moderate		729		40
Conservative		287		16
Very conservative		37		2
Libertarian		37		2
Not sure of ideology		192		11
Did not answer ideology		21		—

APPENDIX A (Cont.)

Sample Characteristics	Frequency		Valid Percent*	
	2001	2004	2001	2004
ETHNICITY				
Afghan	68	37	4	2
African	132	137	7	7
African American	358	371	20	20
Albanian	9	4	1	0
Arab	461	485	26	26
Bangladeshi	78	76	4	4
Bosnian	5	6	0	0
Hispanic		10		1
Indian	130	128	7	7
Iranian	30	31	2	2
Malaysian	2	4	0	0
Pakistani	308	347	17	19
Turkish	18	10	1	1
Other ethnicity	159	71	9	4
Not sure of ethnicity	—	18	—	1
Born in U.S.		665		36
Not born in U.S.		1177		64
Not sure if born in U.S.		4		0
AGE GROUP				
18-29		382		21
30-49		759		42
50-64		496		28
65+		153		9
18-24		225		13
25-34		305		17
35-54		821		46
55-69		364		20
70+		76		4
Did not answer age		56		—
EDUCATION LEVEL				
Less than high school		89		5
High school graduate		236		13
Some college		424		23
College graduate+		1081		59
Did not answer education		16		—

APPENDIX A (Cont.)

Sample Characteristics	Frequency		Valid Percent*	
	2001	2004	2001	2004
PROFESSION				
Managerial	221	184	12	10
Medical	170	165	10	9
Professional/Technical	395	419	22	23
Sales	87	90	5	5
Clerical	46	30	3	2
Service	77	74	4	4
Blue-Collar/Production	44	53	3	3
Student	137	155	8	8
Homemaker	173	187	10	10
Teacher/education	114	158	6	9
Retired	82	115	5	6
Other occupation	198	191	11	10
Not sure of occupation	30	13	2	1
Did not answer occupation	—	12	—	—
MARITAL STATUS				
Married	1225	1283	69	70
Single, never married	344	337	19	18
Divorced/widowed/separated	189	205	11	11
Civil union/domestic partnership	20	5	1	0
Spouse is Muslim	1208	1137	68	89
Spouse not Muslim	214	132	12	10
Not sure if spouse is Muslim	9	—	1	—
HOUSEHOLD SIZE				
1 in household		179		10
2 in household		336		19
3 in household		301		17
4 in household		392		22
5 in household		328		18
6 in household		150		8
7+ in household		133		7
Did not answer household		27		—
NUMBER OF ADULTS IN HOUSEHOLD				
1 adult		226		12
2 adults		912		50
3 adults		331		18

Sample Characteristics	Frequency		Valid Percent*	
	2001	2004	2001	2004
NUMBER OF ADULTS IN HOUSEHOLD CONT.				
4 adults		191		11
5 adults		82		5
6+ adults		38		2
Not sure of adults		34		2
Did not answer adults		32		—
NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN HOUSEHOLD				
1 child		303		17
2 children		338		19
3 children		233		13
4 children		73		4
5 children		34		2
6+ children		19		1
Not sure of children		32		2
Did not answer children		50		—
STOCK OWNERSHIP				
Own stock personally		505		21
Own stock through 401 (k)		505		21
Other pension plan		327		14
No stocks		999		41
Not sure of stocks		81		3
Did not answer stocks				—
Stocks in Islamic financial institutions		73		4
No stocks in Islamic financial institutions		1710		94
Not sure of stocks in Islamic financial institutions		44		2
Did not answer stocks in Islamic financial institutions		19		—
Investor class		394		22
Not investor class		1356		74
Not sure if investor class		76		4
Did not answer investor class		20		—
INCOME LEVEL				
Less than \$15,000	145	172	10	11
\$15,000-\$24,999	152	147	10	9
\$25,000-\$34,999	187	160	13	10
\$35,000-\$49,999	256	276	17	17
\$50,000-\$74,999	320	308	22	19
\$75,000 or more	420	529	28	33
Did not answer income	301	255	—	—
GENDER				
Male	1051	1074	59	58
Female	730	772	41	42

*Numbers have been rounded to the nearest percent and, therefore, might not equal 100.

APPENDIX B

*AMERICAN MUSLIM VIEWS ABOUT DEMOCRACY AND
THE UNITED STATES AND RELIGION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, 2004 (percent)*

Issue	All	African American	South Asian	African	Arab	Other
STRONGLY AGREE						
Very important to be active in politics	59.3	58.8	49.3	64.7	54.2	52
Very important to have children be active in politics	62.7	68.6	58.4	63.4	63.5	62.6
Muslims should participate in politics	85.6	80.3	88.1	83.6	89.5	80.4
Muslims should support worthy non-Muslim candidates	68.2	59.9	69.4	69.7	75.2	62.4
Muslims should participate in interfaith activities	80.3	72.7	82.3	85.8	84.3	76.1
Muslims should donate to non-Muslim social service programs	85.5	76.8	88.5	93.4	87.9	81.1
AGREE						
Influence of religion and values in the United States should increase	71.5	82	69.3	72.5	69.3	63.8
Mosques should express their political view	60.6	90.5	47.2	52.3	59.5	56.3
Muslims should vote in a bloc	59.7	66	58.1	59.8	62.6	48.3
Being Muslim is very important to vote choice	51.1	66.9	47.2	45.8	50.1	39.9
Right for khatibs to discuss politics in the khutbah	43.6	64.5	32.5	36.7	45.5	41.1
American Muslim Taskforce endorsement is very important to vote choice	42.1	52.1	40.2	47.8	43.1	26.1

Source: Project MAPS (2004)

ENDNOTES

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³ The Zogby study was conducted as part of its “culture polls.” Designed to identify respondents from ethnic groups that are normally understudied in large national polls, this study dictated a hybrid sampling method suitable for surveying rare populations. Most Arab-American respondents were identified by screening for ethnic self-identification in a large, general survey of the adult (18 and older) American population. This subsample was supplemented by adult respondents who identified themselves as Arab-American during telephone calls to listed households inhabited by people with Arab surnames. The initial surveys were conducted from December 14, 1999, through February 7, 2000. Due to the bias associated with sampling from telephone listings, Zogby applied poststratification weights for region, age, and gender to more accurately reflect the target populations.

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